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These observations follow today's hearing before the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee on "Opening the Northeast Corridor to Private Competition for Development of High-Speed Rail."

It was stated that Amtrak ridership from 1977 to 2010 has been essentially static. (The memo below uses 1981 data, the most recent year for which we have readily available detailed numbers.)

However, the Fiscal 2010 number cited does not include either the former New York-Philadelphia Clockers (2.2 million riders in 1981; effectively turned over to New Jersey Transit in 2005) or the Philadelphia-Harrisburg line (895,000 riders in 1981; 1.3 million in 2010).

Considering Fiscal 1981, the most recent year for which we have detailed statistics at hand, and excluding the above two services, there were 7.7 million intercity riders on the Northeast Corridor in 1981. The 2010 number--10.4 million--thus is a 26% increase. Also, Amtrak prices these services aggressively, due both to a shortage of rolling stock and pressure from the federal government to maximize revenues.

Considering premium services only, 3.2 million Acela Express riders in 2010 represents a 146% increase over 1.3 million Metroliner riders in 1981.

Passenger-miles have increased in both categories. A passenger-mile is one passenger traveling one mile. This takes into account how far riders travel, and is the standard measure of intercity travel.

By that measure, 1.708 billion passenger-miles in 2010 on the Northeast Corridor routes represent an 83% increase over the 932 million posted in 1981. This reflects that, over the years, short-distance travelers have gravitated to commuter-agency services and Amtrak has focused more closely on the true intercity market. Simple ridership counts do not reflect this change in the mix.

It was also stated that long-distance ridership was static over the same period. In 1981, the long-distance total was 4.7 million, and last year it was 4.5 million, a decline of 4%. This reflects discontinuance of some routes and a downsizing of the fleet as new capacity added was less than old cars retired. NARP is encouraged that additional cars are on order, but only a small number of them will represent new capacity. The need is for much greater investment, yet it represents a huge challenge in the present environment just to get Amtrak's relatively modest fleet plan funded.

All can agree that the state-supported corridors have been hugely successful. This points up what American travelers already know: invest in good service and the riders will come.

For the short term, expanding intercity service on the Northeast Corridor must rely primarily on adding cars to existing trains. The lead time for addressing infrastructure shortages is measured in years. Until new tunnels are built, commuter trains and intercity trains will be competing for the use of just two tracks under the Hudson River-just one track on weekends and in the early mornings, when the other is routinely out of service for maintenance.

Decline in Amtrak employees from 29,000 to 19,000 is cited as evidence that Amtrak is a failure. But about half that decline is attributable to the transfer of MBTA commuter rail service to a different operator; another 2,500 decline resulted from Amtrak abandoning its mail and freight businesses and closing three former business units.

--Ross B. Capon, President & CEO
National Association of Railroad Passengers www.narprail.org<http://www.narprail.org>
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