EMAIL DETAILS

I thought you might be interested in my written testimony for today's
hearing on Cambodia before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

With best regards,

Ken


Kenneth Wollack
President
National Democratic Institute
455 Massachusetts Ave., NW, 8th Floor
Washington, DC 20001
202-728-5500 <(202)%20728-5500> (Tel)
888-875-2887 <(888)%20875-2887> (Fax)
email: ken@ndi.org
website: www.ndi.org


Statement by

Kenneth Wollack

President, National Democratic Institute

before the

House Committee on Foreign Affairs

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

December 12, 2017


Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sherman, thank you for this opportunity to
testify before the Subcommittee on developments in Cambodia.

Recent actions by Cambodia’s government to dissolve the opposition Cambodia
National Rescue Party (CNRP), effectively transformed the country into a
one-party state. The arrest of Kem Sokha, the leader of the CNRP on
spurious charges, the banning of over 100 opposition leaders from political
activities, the arrests of political activists, and the crackdown on
independent news media and civil society have isolated the country and put
its further democratic development in serious doubt. In addition, the
ruling Cambodia People’s Party (CPP) is systematically replacing local and
national lawmakers affiliated with the opposition with those loyal to the
ruling CPP.

These and previous actions by the Cambodian government should be seen as
nothing less than a clear violation of the spirit and letter of the 1991
Paris Peace Agreement, which ended the nation’s 12 year civil war. That
agreement -- signed by 19 governments, including the United States and
China -- required Cambodia to respect human rights as enshrined in
principal international human rights instruments, and called for Cambodia
to follow “a system of liberal democracy on the basis of pluralism.” The
accords also mandated “periodic and genuine elections...with a requirement
that electoral procedures provide a full and fair opportunity to organize
and participate in the electoral process.” Cambodia’s descent into
autocracy also threatens to overturn the efforts of the international
community, which has spent billions of dollars on Cambodia’s democratic
development -- as well as the tireless work of countless Cambodian citizens
-- over the past 26 years.

When the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement was signed, Cambodia was emerging from
decades of war, the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime and Vietnamese occupation.
The country was economically devastated and the institutions of governance
weak or non-existent. In some areas, much progress has been made, largely
due to the commitment of international donors and efforts of the many
thousands of Cambodians who have worked to secure the vision of the peace
accords and a better future for their country. The U.S. has played a major
role in the country’s development, funding projects in the fields of
agriculture, education and public health. U.S. support also has helped
develop a labor framework and $100 million travel industry; funded efforts
to preserve Cambodia’s cultural heritage; and assisted in strengthening the
electoral system, rule of law, political parties, the parliament and civil
society. Many of these programs, including those carried out by the
National Democratic Institute (NDI), have been supported by USAID, the
National Endowment for Democracy and the Department of State’s Bureau for
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor.

NDI has focused its efforts in Cambodia on developing the country’s system
of governance and building a modern, more democratic political party
system. Working in the country since 1992, NDI has worked at the local
level to sponsor hundreds of community-level, multi-party dialogues,
offering villagers the opportunity to voice their concerns to elected
officials; sponsored election campaign debates throughout the country;
assisted citizen organizations to build their capacity to monitor
elections; and worked at the commune level to strengthen public
participation in local governance. NDI has also assisted the efforts of
ruling and opposition political parties to enhance their efforts to
participate in elections; monitor polling sites on election day; develop
greater opportunities for leadership by women and youth; and build more
modern and democratic party structures. Other organizations have worked to
promote women’s economic and political empowerment, develop a more
competent judicial system and train a cadre of professional journalists. In
all of its work, NDI has engaged the major political parties and the ruling
CPP has participated actively in all of the Institute’s programs.

While serious development challenges remain, advances have been made,
including improved health care, a better education system and the
proliferation of an independent and active civil society. Although Cambodia
is still a poor country, its economy has recently been growing at about
seven7 percent. Cambodia’s elections have never met international standards
and have often been characterized by violence and intimidation; however,
the 2017 commune council elections were a marked improvement over the past
and experienced a turnout of slightly over 90 percent.

The Cambodian people have struggled, sometimes at great personal risk, to
help advance the nation’s economic and political development. However, the
progress that has been made is unlikely to be sustained without the
underpinning of a democratic process. The absence of a multi-party
political system that helps ensure the accountability of public officials
and provides a check on official corruption, as well as the lack of a free
media and public participation in the political process, put the country’s
stability and further development at serious risk.

Cambodian officials have developed a “color revolution” narrative to
justify their repressive measures. They claim that the opposition party was
colluding with civil society, various individuals and foreign governments,
including the U.S., to overthrow the regime. The narrative is based on the
civil society-led movements in countries such as Serbia, Georgia,
Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine with claims that these were foreign-inspired
attempts to replace legitimate governments with ones more acceptable to
western democracies. In fact, these were movements that were organized to
protect the integrity of elections, and their actions were triggered by
massive electoral fraud engineered by authoritarian regimes. The so-called
“people power” movements began in the Philippines in response to the effort
by Ferdinand Marcos to steal the 1986 “snap” presidential election.

There is a more persuasive explanation for the government’s repression. In
hindsight, Cambodia’s recent history provides strong evidence that the top
leadership of the nation’s ruling party has never been committed to a
genuine democratic political process nor willing to accept defeat, or even
the risk of defeat, at the polls. Since the transitional period began in
1991, the CPP has dominated the political landscape, maintaining control of
the police, military, civil bureaucracy and virtually all of local
government. However, the peace accords spawned a large number of civil
society groups and they, as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
that have emerged since then, were able to operate most of the time with a
surprising amount of freedom, given the dominance of the ruling party.
Groups working on prison conditions, human rights, and even those
monitoring the political process, as well as those engaged in areas like
land rights and the environment, could criticize the government, especially
in the English language press. Political parties, too, have had some space
in which to operate, although the government used a variety of tactics,
including the use of civil defamation suits, the party registration law and
the filing of criminal charges, to keep them off balance.

According to a report by the Phnom Penh Post, Prime Minister Hun Sen has
also allegedly resorted to purchasing social media followers, using
so-called “click farms”, in an attempt to show an increase in his
popularity. The report showed that during a one month period last year,
only 20 percent of the prime minister’s new Facebook friends were from
Cambodia -- most were from India, the Philippines and Brazil.

The political space open to critics of the government seemed to rely on the
government’s concern for its international standing, its reliance on
foreign assistance and confidence that it could always resort to more
coercive measures if its power was threatened. And, at key moments, those
measures have been employed. In fact, since the Paris Peace Accords,
Cambodia’s political history might be considered as a period marked by
three distinct “coups”.

The first coup occurred when the results of the 1993 elections, conducted
by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), were
overturned; UNTAC spent nearly $2 billion in organizing those polls. The
CPP’s leader, Hun Sen, alleged that the elections were rigged by the United
Nations (UN). Rumors of a coup, and the threat of secession in several
provinces along the border with Vietnam, led King Sihanouk to intervene. He
proposed a power-sharing agreement that laid outside the nation’s
constitutional framework. Under the new arrangement, FUNCINPEC’s leader,
Prince Norodom Ranariddh, and the CPP’s Hun Sen would hold the positions of
First and Second Prime Minister, respectively. The government ministries
also would be shared by each party. Post-UNTAC Cambodia began, then, with a
government that did not reflect the outcome of the elections.

The second coup occurred in 1997, when Hun Sen brutally overthrew his
coalition partner. Prince Ranariddh was charged with smuggling weapons into
the country and conspiring with the outlawed Khmer Rouge. Dozens of
FUNCINPEC supporters were killed during the coup; the offices of opposition
political parties were sacked and burned; and an estimated 60,000
Cambodians fled to refugee camps in Thailand. The exiled opposition soon
regrouped and formed the Union of Cambodian Democrats (UCD). Based in
Thailand, the UCD in exile received support from the international
community. NDI and the International Republican Institute (IRI) provided
assistance designed to help the UCD remain unified and develop a
negotiating strategy for their return to Cambodia.

The third coup, of course, occurred this year when the government disbanded
the CNRP, the only opposition party that could effectively challenge them.
The opposition’s strength was clearly growing. In the 2013 national
elections, the CNRP made a strong showing, increasing their seats in
parliament from 29 to 55, while the CPP saw their representation decline
from 90 to 68 seats. However, the newly elected opposition members refused
to take their seats, alleging that over one million eligible voters had
been omitted from the electoral rolls. Their claim was based, in part, on a
civil society organization’s audit of the voters’ list, which had been
conducted with NDI technical assistance. The ensuing crisis saw tens of
thousands of CNRP supporters take to the streets. The 2013 elections
demonstrated that the opposition CNRP was not only gaining in electoral
strength, but that it also had the ability to mobilize large numbers of
supporters.

In the elections’ aftermath, the CPP-led government became increasingly
repressive. In July of 2015, the National Assembly adopted the Law on
Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations (LANGO). The law, which is
widely viewed as designed to curtail civil society advocacy and political
dissent, was passed despite the strong objections raised by Cambodian NGOs
and the international community. Other actions by the government seemed
designed to keep the opposition in disarray as local commune council
elections, scheduled for 2017, approached. For example, shortly after LANGO
was adopted, Kem Sokha was removed from the office of First Vice-President
of the National Assembly; Kem Ley, a political activist and critic of the
government was assassinated; the political party law was amended to permit
the government to dissolve political parties when their leaders allegedly
committed a crime; opposition leader Sam Rainsy was forced into exile; and
Kem Sokha was convicted on politically-inspired charges. Sokha was later
pardoned by King Sihamoni.

The CPP’s motivation seems obvious. Its own internal polling, leaked to the
press and reported in the local media, showed the ruling party facing tight
races in upcoming local and national elections. Foreshadowing the CPP’s
electoral strategy, the party’s poll, conducted by the Israel-based Shaviv
Strategy and Campaigns, asked respondents “if Sam Rainsy is kept out of the
country during the elections, would that make you more or less likely to
vote for him?” and “if both Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha left the country, who
would you vote for?” and finally “if the CPP limits the CNRP from
campaigning during the next elections, would that make it more or less
likely to vote for the CNRP?” The poll also showed Hun Sen’s favorability
rating at 63 percent, compared to 84 percent for Sam Rainsy. Perhaps the
most disturbing trend for the ruling CPP, according to the Phnom Penh Post,
the poll found that a plurality of respondents would vote for the
opposition in the upcoming commune council and national elections.

Commune council elections were held in June 2017, resulting in a strong
showing for the opposition CNRP. The ruling CPP, which had long dominated
the local governments, retained control of 1,156 of the 1,646 councils, but
the CNRP increased their gains to 489 council chiefs from a previous 40.
The CNRP had won 43.8 percent of the total votes cast, placing them in a
strong position to contest in the 2018 national elections where they would
be more competitive.

There was hope that the commune elections might usher in a period of
greater political pluralism. For the first time, the opposition had a
substantial presence in local government in the nation's heartland; the
political parties had contested vigorously and relatively freely; the voter
rolls had been improved and election authorities performed their
responsibilities fairly and competently. That hope, however, was short
lived.

In August 2017, the CPP’s attention turned to international organizations
which had been operating in Cambodia since the UNTAC era. Between August 16
and 23, Fresh News, a government online news outlet, reported on claims
made on a Facebook page, Kon Khmer, that NDI was colluding with the
opposition to overthrow the government and that the Institute was operating
in the country illegally -- in violation of the NGO registration law. NDI
received a notice from the government on August 23 ordering it to close its
office and withdraw its international staff from the country within seven
days. In the following days, the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia
(RFA) were also shuttered, as were dozens of local broadcast stations which
carried VOA and RFA programming. The Cambodia Daily, the independent
English language newspaper that had been operating since 1963, was forced
to close when it received a $6.3 million tax bill from the government.
These media outlets were the only source of traditional independent media
that reached the interior of the country, where the opposition had recently
performed well in the commune council elections.

Cambodian civil society and political leaders were also a target. Several
civil society organizations were charged with bias under the vague
provisions of LANGO and closed; staff of domestic monitoring groups and
human rights organizations were intimidated and prevented from conducting
their work; staff of NGOs working on sensitive issues such as the
environment, land evictions and land grabbing have always been at risk and
are especially vulnerable in the current political environment. On
September 4, 2017, the political situation escalated when Kem Sokha was
arrested in a midnight raid at his house and charged with treason. Since
his arrest, almost one-half of the opposition’s members of parliament have
fled into exile. Since the dissolving of the CNRP, intimidation has
continued. In early December, Prime Minister Hun Sen threatened to charge
Sam Rainsy, exiled in Paris, with crimes after he urged the armed forces
not to “shoot and kill innocent people” even if ordered to do so. Because
of these repressive measures, an atmosphere of fear permeates the country.

The allegations against NDI were ironic because the Institute, which had
been working in the country since 1992, engaged all the major parties,
including the ruling CPP, in its programs. In fact, the morning that NDI
received the letter ordering the closure of its office and expelling its
international staff from the country, the Institute had met with a
representative of the ruling party to plan its next training session with
the CPP. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had accepted NDI’s
registration documents a year earlier and has yet to act on the submission,
whereas Article 14 of the Cambodia’s Law on Non-Government Organizations
requires the Ministry to make a decision on a registration application
within 45 working days. NDI was in 3 frequent contact with the Ministry and
other government offices concerning its registration status and at no time
did the Cambodian government or any political party communicate to NDI any
concerns about its programs or presence in the country. Moreover, NDI has a
Memorandum of Understanding with the National Election Committee (NEC). It
has worked closely with the NEC, as well as with the Interior Ministry in
implementing the Institute’s village-based political participation
programs.

The Cambodian government’s repressive actions are clearly designed to
maintain the ruling party in power; Prime Minister Hun Sen has repeatedly
said that he wants to continue in office beyond his 32-year reign. He has
also warned of civil war if the ruling CPP was voted out of office.
However, the government’s actions may also represent a strategic
realignment, placing Cambodia more firmly in China’s orbit. While the
Cambodian government was widely condemned by the international community
for its recent repressive measures, China was quick to offer support,
ignoring the provisions of the Paris Peace Agreement to which it is a
signatory. Following the dissolution of the CNRP, China’s Foreign Minister,
Wang Yi stated that “China supports the Cambodian side’s efforts to protect
political stability and achieve economic development, and believes that the
Cambodian government can lead people to deal with domestic and foreign
challenges and smoothly hold elections next year.” The Chinese and
Cambodian governments have also reportedly agreed to cooperate in a joint
think tank to study the so-called color revolutions.

During the past decade, China has been steadily increasing its influence in
Cambodia through foreign investments in infrastructure projects such as
dams and highways, as well as in mines and textiles. Chinese firms are
involved in building apartment buildings, luxury condos and hospitals.
While the U.S. remains Cambodia’s largest export market, China has become
the country’s largest provider of bilateral aid. A spokesman for Cambodia’s
Council of Ministers was recently quoted as saying, “without Chinese aid,
we go nowhere.” In addition, Cambodia’s security cooperation with China is
expanding, while it is contracting with the U.S. In 2016, China and
Cambodia conducted their first bilateral military exercise. The following
year, Cambodia cancelled Ankor Sentinel, an annual military exercise with
the U.S., and also terminated a long-standing Navy Seabees humanitarian
program. China provided 60 percent of Cambodia’s arms purchases in 2013 and
also provides equipment and training to Cambodia’s military. In return,
Cambodia has acted as an ally within the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), effectively preventing the body from achieving consensus
on issues related to territorial claims in the South China Sea.

Whether a strategic realignment would be popular with the Cambodian people
is unclear. One poll conducted in March, 2017 found that 80.7 percent of
Cambodians had either a favorable or very favorable view of the U.S.,
compared to 66.2 percent for China.

Mr. Chairman, it is not too late for the Cambodian government to reverse
its course. Fresh elections should be held and the Cambodian people allowed
to choose their leaders in a credible electoral process. No Cambodian
government elected under the current circumstances would have any claim to
legitimacy.

In order to establish the conditions in which credible elections could be
held, measures the Cambodian government must implement include: reinstating
the CNRP as a legal entity; immediately releasing Kem Sokha and permitting
Sam Rainsy and other CNRP leaders to return from exile; freeing all
political prisoners, including civil society leaders and political
activists; allowing journalists and media outlets to operate free of
violence and intimidation, including VOA, RFA and The Cambodia Daily;
permitting domestic and international election observer groups free access
to monitor all aspects of the electoral process; and forming a new election
commission that includes members of the opposition.

Much work would need to be done to build a level of trust between the
ruling and opposition parties, beginning with the government making a firm
commitment to cease all forms of violence and intimidation and permitting
domestic and international organizations to monitor political conditions in
the county in order to help ensure that the pledge is kept. In addition,
there must be sufficient time before elections are held to permit the
opposition to reassemble in Cambodia, organize and compete.

There has been widespread condemnation of the Cambodian government’s recent
actions from governments and organizations throughout the world, ranging
from the European Union (EU), Sweden and Australia to the
Inter-Parliamentary Union, the French Senate, Human Rights Watch, and the
editorial pages of the Washington Post, New York Times and newspapers
around the globe. Their statements help to bolster the resolve of those
affected by this crisis and hopefully will continue as long as the current
situation persists.

I want to recognize the U.S. Congress, the White House, State Department,
and the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
mission in Phnom Penh for their strong and timely statements in support of
democracy in Cambodia, and for the appropriate actions taken by the U.S.
government in terminating assistance to Cambodia’s election commission and
imposing visa restrictions on those Cambodian officials responsible for
undermining democracy. These words and actions are important because they
demonstrate that concrete measures will be taken unless certain conditions
for the return to a democratic process are met.

There are other actions that the international community should consider
until political conditions in Cambodia show marked improvement. These
include:

1. Consider the withdrawal or suspension of all but humanitarian aid to the
Cambodian government until the conditions for the return to democracy are
met. At a minimum those conditions should be the release from custody of
Kem Sokha and allowing Sam Rainsy to return from exile, as well as dropping
the politically motivated charges against the CNRP leaders. Further
conditions should include insisting that the Cambodian government cease all
intimidation of its political opponents and permit all exiled opposition
party leaders to return to their seats in the National Assembly and local
councils. The government also must permit the news media to operate freely,
including VOA, RFA and The Cambodia Daily. Civil society workers must be
freed from custody and allowed to perform their work without intimidation.

2. Continue to support the work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
within Cambodia. NGOs working within the country are especially vulnerable
to government reprisals and need the continued support of the international
community to carry on their work. These include not only organizations that
focus on the political process but also groups that work on sensitive
issues such as deforestation, land grabbing and human trafficking.
Government repression coupled with a loss of international funding would be
especially tragic for organizations that conduct critical work.

3. Review the possibility of altering the terms of trade with Cambodia. As
previously stated, the U.S. is the largest export market for Cambodian
goods, receiving 25 percent of Cambodia’s exports; the EU is the next
largest. This is the area in which the international community perhaps has
the most leverage for inducing positive change.

4. Continue international engagement -- such as the international response
to Cambodia’s 1997 coup. Following that coup, an informal diplomatic
network, known as the Friends of Cambodia Group, helped Hun Sen and the
political opposition come to an agreement on the conditions under which the
exiles would return to Cambodia to participate in national elections the
following year. The UN accreditation committee decided that Cambodia's seat
in the General Assembly should remain vacant, thereby withholding UN
recognition of the government at that time. Similar moves might help pave
the way for new negotiations.

5. Support exiled political leaders’ efforts to negotiate their return.
Despite their current condition, the CNRP opposition remains a legitimate
and important political force within Cambodia, having recently received
over three million votes in the commune council elections. However, over
100 opposition activists and elected officials are in exile, largely
scattered throughout three countries: the U.S., Australia and Thailand.
They currently lack the ability to remain a cohesive force. As in 1997,
continued support should be provided to the CNRP leadership to help them
convene, and communicate with their supporters and the international
community.

6. Assist efforts to engage international financial institutions, as well
as global and regional bodies on the Cambodia issue. The U.S. and other
like-minded governments should use their influence, and support the efforts
of others, in engaging all of these bodies to help ensure that they
understand the political situation in Cambodia from the broadest
viewpoints, including Cambodia’s political opposition, and are not only
hearing the Cambodian government’s narrative. The international community
also should consider what actions these institutions might take in helping
to resolve the crisis. Institutions, such as the UN, can speak with a moral
force and have the experience and ability to provide a forum where
contending political forces can at least begin to discuss the future. The
UN should also engage because it is the legacy of UNTAC that is threatened.
Regional bodies such as ASEAN can play a role in mediation, and there is
precedent for its engagement. ASEAN issued a strong statement following the
1997 coup, and postponed Cambodia’s membership application which was
pending when that coup occurred. Financial institutions, such as the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund also have precedents for taking
actions when political instability could lead to an unfavorable investment
climate.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the Committee for your interest and concern.
The international community and the Cambodian people have invested a great
deal in efforts to build a stable, democratic and prosperous Cambodia since
1991. Very few countries suffered more violence in the 20th century than
Cambodia, and its people deserve the democratic future envisioned in the
1991 accords