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NDI Algeria Assessment
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ken@ndi.org
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2017-01-30 17:02:37
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ken@ndi.org
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I wanted to forward the following independent evaluation of NDI's program in Algeria funded by the State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). While the evaluation does not overlook aspects of the program that did not produce results, due to circumstances beyond NDI's control, the evaluator goes into great detail about the achievements of our efforts with women, using both quantitative and qualitative methods. With best regards, Ken Kenneth Wollack President National Democratic Institute 455 Massachusetts Ave., NW, 8th Floor Washington, DC 20001 202-728-5500 (Tel) 888-875-2887 (Fax) email: ken@ndi.org website: www.ndi.org Algeria, D.C.-managed grant: Enhancing Women’s Political Engagement and Citizen Oversight Background *Country background* Algeria is not an electoral democracy, and the country is rated as “not free” by Freedom House. The 2014 presidential election was criticized as fraudulent, and it returned ailing President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to a fourth term. While the executive controls the main levers of power, the 2012 elections to the relatively weak lower house of parliament were viewed as the freest and fairest in years,[1] 23 new parties were registered, and a 2011 law established a quota that ensured that one-third of MPs were women. Elected officials at the regional and municipal levels say that they are largely free to address local concerns without government interference. Algerians in interviews and in print say that their country had “its Arab Spring” in 1988, when demonstrations led to free elections in 1990 and 1991 that were won by Islamists. The new political reality led to a reactionary military coup in 1992 that resulted in 200,000 deaths during a 10-year civil war known as the “black decade.” [2] With memories of that instability still fresh, Algeria was largely unaffected by the 2011 Arab Spring, in part because of high oil prices that helped the government provide subsidies and fund social programs.[3] *Program background* The Enhancing Women’s Political Engagement and Citizen Oversight program, implemented by the National Democratic Institute, is a four-year, $2.7 million cooperative agreement that ended December 31, 2016. The project initially trained newly-elected women members of Parliament, but NDI has since shifted its focus to women elected officials from regional and municipal councils. That component also provides technical support for coalition building and advocacy efforts, in partnership with women’s CSOs. A second component provided technical assistance to the Observatoire de la Société Civile pour l’Observation des Elections (Observatory), a coalition of more than 25 CSOs set up to conduct domestic monitoring of the 2014 presidential election. This effort was based on the success of a similar effort for the 2012 parliamentary elections. NDI is also conducting a political party-strengthening program with funding from the United Kingdom. Findings *Question 1: Programmatic objectives* The NDI project began in September 2012 with the goals of supporting women elected officials to become more effective representatives; improving coordination between those officials and CSOs; and promoting and training a domestic monitoring coalition for the 2014 presidential election. Work on the first goal began with women elected to the lower house of the national parliament, and expanded over time to include women serving on the councils of the 48 provinces (*wilayas*) and of municipalities. NDI was able to use its connections with political parties to reach elected women interested in the program. The most notable results from the program with women officials were the creation of a women’s caucus in parliament (which is creating a nationwide network of elected women at all levels) and the amendment of several pieces of legislation, including, child support, the rights of divorced women, and combatting violence against women. The women involved in those efforts credited NDI with giving them the confidence, skills and knowledge to analyze legislation, modify bills, advocate their positions in the mass media, and hold productive meetings with constituents. One local official said that the training not only helped her become more effective, but also advanced her political career, saying, “To indicate on my CV that I have participated in NDI’s programs is very impactful.” A CSO activist who worked with the program pointed out that the law on violence against women had been 15 years in the making. She noted that lobbying the government is more effective than lobbying parliament, because the government has the exclusive right of legislative initiative; i.e., only the government can introduce a bill in parliament, which individual members of parliament cannot do. At the local level, participants stated that they used their training to implement specific initiatives. For example, a municipal councilor described how she used her new knowledge of the municipal budget to develop a home health care plan that will purchase vehicles and medical kits to enable doctors to visit elderly patients in their homes. Another described how she used her budget training to develop an initiative to develop solutions to parking problems in her community, and a third described provincial school construction and adult literacy projects. NDI officials said that this activity allowed them to work outside of Algiers in 13 of the 48 provinces. As of the June 2016 quarterly report, the latest available during the data collection period, NDI was on track to reach its results and fulfill its activity plan in its work with women elected officials and CSOs. A total of 386 participants demonstrated improvement in their functions as representatives, exceeding the target of 350. Total attendance at NDI events was 484, exceeding the target of 200. Quantitative measures like this are an adequate measure of the implementer’s level of activity and effectiveness. A MEPI official said that there has been noticeable improvement in the quality of legislation. Participants interviewed by the evaluation team praised NDI trainers, particularly training on legislative procedure with a former Canadian MP and minister and a Malaysian MP. Five MPs specifically cited programs with foreign trainers or study visits as particularly useful to them, with several calling for more exchange visits. “The former Canadian minister was magnificent. She helped us improve our ability to study bills,” said one MP. Another MP said, “The most important, the best, was exchanging experiences with a Canadian MP. We learned how to persuade other MPs, the tools that are used.” While most beneficiaries were grateful for interaction with women from established democracies, two women said foreigners were unfamiliar with the country and not as effective. “The trainer had come from Canada; the content was very far from Algerian reality. It was not beneficial,” said one MP. A provincial assembly member said, “The shortcomings of the programs is that trainers usually come from abroad, and they are not well informed about our country, and that means that sometimes there is a gap or mismatch between the content of the training and the reality in our country.” Another effective activity was a series of evening discussions during Ramadan that brought together elected officials and CSO representatives for an open discussion. CSO officials were also used as trainers; the Information and Documentation Center for Children’s and Women’s Rights, known by its French acronym CIDDEF, conducted a regular training series. NDI reached its target of five CSOs that could point to policy changes thanks to their advocacy, an indicator that measures the activity of CSOs, rather than the extent of their impact. CSO representatives who were interviewed all pointed to the legislation on child support, the rights of divorced women, and combatting violence against women as the greatest impact from their participation. The election observation component proved less successful. While NDI organized a study mission to Jordan in January 2013 and began training observers in February 2013, the observation component ultimately collapsed due to political differences. At the time, President Bouteflika was in poor health following a stroke and seeking treatment outside the country while running for re-election. According to MEPI and NDI officials, the head of the Observatory decided to work for the president’s campaign without discussing this move with other partner CSOs. Combined with the government’s failure to recognize citizen observers, his decision proved the death knell for a non-partisan observation mission, though the effort was never formally abandoned. An abortive post-election effort by NDI to transform the coalition into a government watchdog initiative never gained traction. *Question 2: Changing political environment* While political changes in Algeria were limited with regard to the Arab Spring, NDI did adapt its program to a major development in this period: the institution of a one-third quota for women to hold seats in parliament and local councils. By designing the program to work with women elected officials, NDI took advantage of a new opening in a political system that changes at a glacial pace. NDI officials noted that they have worked in Algeria since the 1990s, and established their Algiers office in 2002. They and MEPI officials said NDI has built a level of trust with the government that allows it to operate as one of the few international political development programs, and that it has been able to react to political developments. Embassy officials said it was a “heavy lift” for them to persuade the government to officially register NDI in 2014. The program also saw an opportunity in the kinds of legislation that MPs addressed. In many countries, questions of social policy, women’s rights, and welfare are sometimes stereotyped as “women’s issues.” While such pigeonholing is discriminatory and should be resisted, it can mean that there is some freedom of maneuver that does not exist in more sensitive areas that may be viewed by an authoritarian government as directly threatening its power. In a similar vein, the attempt to organize domestic observation of the election of the president, where true political power lies, proved more threatening than the successful observation of the elections to the relatively weak legislative branch. While NDI sought to build on that success for the presidential election, the failure of the effort demonstrated the limits on political freedom in Algeria. A January 2016 law creating a national observation commission, with seats split between government and civil society representatives, could provide an opening for future support to election observation, if the regime is open to foreign assistance to a body at the heart of national sovereignty. According to U.S. Embassy Algiers, the head of the new commission was appointed in October 2016, and appointment of other commissioners is expected by the end of 2016. Conclusions The NDI program met its programming objectives. It was successful in training women MPs and local officials to be more effective representatives. The program was a particularly effective response to the quota legislation that guaranteed a dramatic increase in women representatives in the parliament elected in 2012. The NDI program was also an effective way for MEPI to promote development of democratically elected legislators without an institutional support program to build the rudimentary capacities of a weak, understaffed parliament. It made sense to target women MPs in the wake of the new quota law for the 2012 elections, as they were a prime audience in need of training. With the next elections scheduled for 2017, MEPI could build on this success by aiming a follow-on program at all new MPs, regardless of gender. Until parliament gains sufficient power to serve as a co-equal branch of government, a dedicated legislative support program for the institution is not indicated. One risk of member training, however, is that the gains are lost if the member loses her re-election bid. The performance of NDI trainees in the 2017 elections will provide an indication of how long-lasting the results of this component will be. The component to bring together CSOs and elected representatives showed some success, particularly with regard to the legislative achievements. The program did not establish a formal partnership between civil society and government, but it did use experienced civil society leaders as trainers for women elected officials. The attempt to create a domestic election observation coalition failed due to government opposition to the idea and a decision by the leader of the non-partisan Observatory to join the president’s campaign. The experience of this program provides some insights into the pace and nature of political reform in Algeria. The regime appears willing to permit democratic elections and governance in areas that do not threaten its power or core interests. As a result, elections to a weak parliament are permitted to be free, while the presidential election is controlled. Parliament is permitted to modify social legislation that has minimal effect on the finances or security of the state. Local officials are free to address issues of everyday life. In addition to allowing the national parliament and local councils to operate freely, the regime has permitted political pluralism at the party level. While NDI’s political party program is not funded by MEPI, it is an important complement to work with elected officials and CSOs, and MEPI would benefit from continued coordination between the two components and donors. The 2019 presidential election will provide evidence of the regime’s willingness to allow free political competition, as the country is likely to get a new president to replace the ailing Bouteflika. While election observation could be an important assist to developing Algerian democracy, a threatened regime could ban such an effort. Closely watching developments over the next three years and acting flexibly could provide an opening for successful MEPI programming. ------------------------------ [1] BBC, “Arab Uprising: Country by Country – Algeria,” Dec. 16, 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482297 [2] See for example: Moshin Khan and Karim Mezran, *No Arab Spring for Algeria*, Atlantic Council, May 2014; and Kamel Daoud, “The Algerian Exception,” *The New York Times, *May 30, 2015. [3] See for example: Yahia, H. Zoubir, “Algeria after the Arab Spring: Algiers Came out Ahead – but the Good Times Could Be Over,” *Foreign Affairs*, February 2016
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