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I thought you would be interested in receiving today's testimony by Laura
Jewett, NDI's director for Eurasia, before the Senate Appropriations
Committee on "authoritarian aggression" in the region.

Best regards,

Ken


Kenneth Wollack
President
National Democratic Institute
455 Massachusetts Ave., NW, 8th Floor
Washington, DC 20001
202-728-5500 (Tel)
888-875-2887 (Fax)
email: ken@ndi.org
website: www.ndi.org


*Statement by Laura Jewett*

*Regional Director for Eurasia Programs*

*National Democratic Institute*

*before the*


*Subcommittee on Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs*

*of the Senate Committee on Appropriations*


March 29, 2017


Chairman Graham, Ranking Member Leahy and members of the Subcommittee, I
appreciate the opportunity to share with you some reflections on the impact
that authoritarian aggression is having on civil society in Eurasia, as
well as on the responses that activists in the region are undertaking and
the kinds of support they would welcome.


It is an honor to testify before this subcommittee and to represent a panel
that includes Jan Surotchak from our sister organization, IRI, and Vladimir
Kara-Murza. Vladimir personifies courage. His integrity and determination
in fighting for democracy, at great personal cost, are an inspiration to so
many around the world, myself included.


It is particularly fitting that *this *subcommittee is holding this hearing
on Russia’s role in the region, in that one of the messages emanating from
Moscow for many years has been the distortion and discrediting of
international democracy assistance in Eurasia. So when there are calls to
cut democracy assistance -- using language and arguments that echo
narratives coming from Moscow -- the motives should be questioned. Are
there genuine concerns about the proper use of funds? Or is it a tactic
that wittingly or unwittingly plays into a larger scheme to undermine
challenges to authoritarian rule throughout the region?


It is critical that we distinguish clearly between our own democratic
values and another country’s hostile efforts to have us abandon those
principles. To give credence to Russian government narratives about
democracy assistance, in particular, would be to abet authoritarian
aggression.


*Hybrid Warfare*


The U.S. intelligence community and many other analysts have described in
detail how the Russian regime is pursuing the suppression of fundamental
freedoms at home matched by “hybrid warfare” abroad. This hybrid warfare
encompasses propaganda and misinformation; espionage; cyberattacks;
corruption as a tool for buying influence; financing of political parties,
think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, and academic institutions;
coercive economic measures; and covert and overt military actions. These
efforts fan the flames of broader anti-democratic trends, such as extreme
polarization, xenophobia, and isolationism, while simultaneously exploiting the
fundamental characteristics of open societies, such as political rivalry
and competition, free press and speech, and unrestricted social media. They
aim to tear down democratic institutions.


The tactics of hybrid warfare picked up momentum in 2014 with the
occupation of Crimea and have spread more recently to Western Europe and
the U.S. But they have been standard operating procedure throughout Eurasia
for more than 15 years.


*Democracy and Global Security*


This authoritarian aggression poses urgent threats -- not just to the
sovereignty and stability of the countries being targeted, but also to
global democracy and security. We ignore it at our peril.


In this interconnected and interdependent world, what happens for good or
for bad within the borders of states has regional and, sometimes, global
impact. At a basic level, we have a direct interest in how people live and
how they are treated by their governments.


We are not alone in this enterprise. Over the past three decades,
nongovernmental groups around the world, other governments and
intergovernmental organizations have joined the effort to promote and
sustain open, responsive and accountable governance, along with citizen
engagement.


Our ultimate foreign policy goal is a world that is secure, stable, humane
and safe, where the risk of war is minimal. Yet the reality is that
hotspots most likely to erupt into violence are found, for the most part,
in areas of the world that are nondemocratic -- places that have been
defined by the Defense Department as the “arc of instability.” These are
places that experience ethnic conflict and civil war, they generate refugee
flows across borders, they are places where terrorists and traffickers are
harbored. The international community has rightly worked to restore order
by helping to establish a democratic framework for governance in a number
of these countries. The response has not always been entirely successful,
but on the whole, the introduction of democratic processes and citizen
engagement has made these countries less dangerous than they had been. The
cost for the United States in that effort has been small. Foreign
assistance is only about 1 percent of the total U.S. budget, and democracy
assistance represents just 4 percent of our foreign aid.


As Tom Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment points out, “In most of the
dozens of countries where the United States is employing diplomatic,
economic, and assistance measures to support potential or struggling
democratic transitions -- from Cambodia, Indonesia, and Mongolia to El
Salvador, Kenya, Nigeria, and Venezuela -- such efforts align closely with
and serve a critical array of unquestionably hard interests. These include
limiting the strategic reach of the United States’ autocratic rivals,
fighting terrorism, reducing international drug trafficking, and
undercutting drivers of massive refugee flows.”


The ‘hard interests’ in Eurasia demand a commitment to democracy assistance
as a minimal response to hybrid warfare and authoritarian aggression in the
region.


*False Equivalencies*


False equivalencies are a common distraction technique in misinformation
campaigns. Thus, one of the tropes of authoritarian propaganda is an
equation between hostile external pressure on the one hand and good-faith
international assistance on the other. In this warped view, meddling in
other countries’ sovereign political processes is fair game since it shares
some superficial characteristics with democracy assistance. As though there
is moral equivalence between two doctors -- one of whom prescribes medicine
and the other of whom administers poison -- because they both attended to
the patient. But make no mistake: democracy assistance has absolutely
nothing in common with authoritarian aggression.


Take elections as an example. Russian electoral interference has included,
among other tactics, the hacking, theft and broadcasting of private data;
deliberate distribution of false news and misinformation; malicious
trolling; blackmail and discrediting of targets; and manipulation of voter
registries or results tabulation. By design, it pollutes political
discourse, undermines public confidence in the process, and tips the scales
through subterfuge. It corrodes the electoral environment regardless of
whether it impacts the ultimate vote count. It is a violation of citizens’
sovereign right to freely choose their own representatives. These forms of
electoral interference are a weapon that is potentially more powerful than
warships or missiles. The aggressor can deprive the opposing side of its
sovereignty without seizing territory.


Democracy assistance around elections could not be more different. Consider
the electoral environment in authoritarian countries. Opposition political
parties are harassed, delegitimized, and frequently barred from the ballot.
Those opposition parties that manage to register find they are unable to
communicate with voters -- their campaign activities are shut down and they
are denied access to the state-controlled media. The media itself is
muzzled. Citizens are intimidated or bribed into voting as the regime sees
fit. Civil society groups seeking to monitor the process are shut down and
persecuted, and in some cases their leaders are sent to prison. Election
administrators, prosecutors and judges answer directly to the regime.
Results are predetermined in favor of the incumbent, often with grossly
inflated turnout figures and victory tallies above 90 percent. In short,
voters are denied the right to express their free will. These are elections
in name only. They violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, among
other international conventions.


When governments, intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental
groups offer democracy assistance to partners in authoritarian or reforming
countries, the objective is to promote citizens’ fundamental right to
express their political will freely. That means responding to requests from
governments, parliaments, political parties, civic groups, and election
administrators to help promote integrity, transparency, participation and
accountability in the elections – first and foremost so that basic human
rights are defended, but also so that everyone involved can have confidence
in the outcome. The purpose of these efforts is not to influence outcomes
or change regimes. Rather, it is to help give voice to people who might
otherwise be excluded from the process due to a tilted playing field. The
assistance is offered openly and in good faith and democratic leaders
welcome it because they understand that credible elections are a pillar of
a country’s stability and sovereignty.

To give credence to the false equivalence between hybrid warfare and
democracy assistance is to do a grave disservice to courageous democracy
activists around the world who have made tremendous sacrifices, including
risking their lives, because they simply seek free elections, free speech,
and a voice in their country’s future. The very least they deserve is
solidarity from democratic societies around the world.


*Perspectives from Civil Society*


Let me share with you just a few examples to illustrate how authoritarian
aggression plays out on the ground in Eurasia.


Evgenia Chirikova is a leading Russian environmental activist. She started
a movement in 2010 to defend the Khimki forest near St. Petersburg from
construction of a highway. She mobilized thousands of protesters and
collected tens of thousands of signatures on petitions, showing that
activism ran much deeper than many assumed. As a consequence of her own
activism, Evgenia was arrested several times. Some of her fellow activists
and journalists were harassed and beaten. In 2011, state authorities
threatened to take her children away on the grounds that they were being
abused. To keep her family intact, Evgenia was forced to move to Estonia
and, undaunted, she continues to support civic activism from there. She has
submitted written testimony to this subcommittee in which she outlines the
many examples of grassroots organizing that are underway in Russia, despite
the risks and obstacles. The peaceful anti-corruption demonstrations that
took place just this past weekend appear to reflect her viewpoint.


Russia is a participating state in the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Under the OSCE’s Copenhagen Document, Russia
is committed to facilitating international and domestic observation of
elections. Yet Russia’s nonpartisan citizen election monitors are routinely
vilified for simply exercising their right to support electoral integrity.
They face fines, arrests and closure of their organizations. When
international observers, including those from the OSCE, reported that the
2011 parliamentary and 2012 presidential elections were fundamentally
flawed, these criticisms were deemed tantamount to interference -- in
another example of false equivalence.


One of the impacts of the repression in Russia has been the isolation of
activists from their peers in the international community. Under the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Russian citizens
have the basic rights to to freedom of association and expression, which
includes the ability to see, receive and impart information, including
across borders. Yet international organizations working in Russia have
faced smear campaigns in the media, spurious investigations and legal
challenges, threats of blackmail and violence, physical assaults, and laws
designed explicitly to restrict contact with Russian citizens. The net
effect is to intimidate civic and political activists, who have reason to
fear that engaging with an international organization would cause them to
be targeted themselves.


Anar Mammadli is the head of a respected nonpartisan citizen election
monitoring group in Azerbaijan called the Election Monitoring and Democracy
Studies Center. EMDS, as it is called, issued a report that described
substantial fraud in Azerbaijan’s 2013 presidential election, echoing the
findings of other credible observer groups such as the OSCE. As a
consequence, Anar served 2.5 years in prison.


Anar will tell you that Azerbaijan’s repressive techniques are not
necessarily *imposed *from Russia, but rather borrowed quite willingly.
They include “black PR” or smear campaigns in the state-controlled media,
travel bans, blackmail, harassment of family members, loss of employment,
fabricated tax assessments and legal charges, conscription, and arrest and
imprisonment. Earlier this month, Amnesty International reported on a
sustained “spear-phishing” campaign in which the passwords, contacts and
private communications of Azerbaijani activists were compromised, resulting
in the arrest and imprisonment of some of those people. Currently there are
more than 100 political prisoners in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, most
Azerbaijani citizens have access to news primarily from state-controlled
Russian or Azerbaijani television, both of which promote an anti-democratic
and anti-Western perspective. Yet Anar Mammadli, like Evgenia Chirikova,
continues his work to promote democracy and human rights in the face of
these risks.


Belarus is quite dependent, economically and militarily, on its neighbor to
the East. The regime of President Lukashenko chafes at these
vulnerabilities and periodically turns to the West in an effort to increase
its room for maneuver. In times of domestic dissent, however, the
government reverts to the authoritarian example set by Russia and
reinforced by the dominance of Russian media in the region.


Events this month are a vivid example. Citizens across the country have
taken to the streets to protest an ill-conceived tax on unemployment. At
first it appeared that the government might try to defuse the situation,
but it has since lashed out, reverting to a pattern familiar in Moscow but
not seen in Belarus for several years. The government is labeling the
protesters “fifth columnists” and “bandits” under the control of the West.
This is a clear echo of the overused and fabricated Kremlin claim that all
dissent or opposition is organized from the West. More than 300 Belarusians
have been arrested or detained in the last three weeks -- some brutally.
Nearly half of these have been sentenced to jail terms.


The picture from Georgia is more promising, but equally complicated.
Georgia’s foreign policy is explicitly Western-oriented: it is pro-EU and,
for the most part, pro-NATO. NDI’s public opinion surveys show that most
Georgians aspire to a democratic and European future. It is thus no
coincidence that in 2008, six years before the occupation of Crimea, Russia
invaded and occupied Georgian territory in South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
effectively obstructing Georgia’s NATO aspirations while granting Russia
untold political, economic, and military leverage.


In addition, the influence of external propaganda is strongly felt. Rural
Georgians and ethnic minorities who feel neglected by politicians in
Tbilisi are particularly likely to be exposed to, and sympathetic toward,
Russian messages about alleged threats emanating from the West. One example
is the elevation of anti-gay, anti-feminist, and xenophobic campaigns to
the forefront of the political agenda. This narrative holds that embracing
Europe will force Georgians to violate long-held conservative values. An
emphasis on the overriding importance of culture and tradition has the
effect of legitimizing violence and exclusion. These campaigns did not
originate in Georgia, but once introduced they took root and are now
impacting the political landscape. Another prominent narrative is that EU
and NATO aspirations are nothing more than naive fantasies. And, as in
Belarus, a third narrative is that if Georgia *does *stray too far toward
the West, it will face further military consequences from Moscow.


The presence and tolerance of vocal civic watchdog groups is a sign of a
country’s democratic strength. The subcommittee has received testimony from
representatives of two such groups in Georgia, Transparency
International-Georgia and the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association. Ana
Natsvlishvili, Eka Gigauri and Giorgi Oniani paint a vivid picture of the
costs that hybrid warfare is imposing on Georgian democracy and sovereignty.


I would like to focus particular attention on Ukraine. The outcome of
Ukraine’s struggle to defend its sovereignty and democratic aspirations
will have far-reaching consequences for the broader region. Success in
Ukraine would be a victory for Ukrainians, first and foremost, but also a
major setback for authoritarian aggressors in the neighborhood. It is thus
no coincidence that Ukraine has served as a laboratory for every weapon in
the hybrid warfare arsenal, particularly since the occupation of Crimea
three years ago.


Ukraine of course continues to face grave challenges, including economic
disruptions, political turmoil, the illegal occupation of Crimea and a war
in the East. A favorable resolution of these crises is by no means
guaranteed.


Mustafa Nayyem, a journalist, was one of the first activists to call his
fellow Ukrainians to Independence Square for the pro-democracy
demonstrations now known as the Revolution of Dignity. Svitlana Zalishchuk,
a journalist and a civic activist, was also a leader on the Maidan.
Remember that more than a hundred people were killed in those
demonstrations. Both Mustafa and Svitlana were elected to parliament in
2014 as part of a wave of young democratic activists for whom the
Revolution of Dignity was a call to public service. Mustafa and Svitlana
have submitted written testimony to this subcommittee describing numerous
examples of information warfare that have disrupted Ukraine’s sovereign
political processes.


The prevailing misinformation would have us believe that Ukraine is deeply
divided and that those Ukrainians who are not supporting fascism are
desperate to be rescued by Russia. But recent NDI public opinion research
paints an entirely different picture.


First, Ukrainians are overwhelmingly united on the big issues facing their
country. The vast majority -- 86 percent -- says it is “important” or “very
important” that Ukraine become a fully-functioning democracy. Large
majorities support this point regardless of where they live in the country
or which party they support. Ukrainians also have a clear and consistent
view about how to define democracy: it means equal justice for all, free
elections and fundamental freedoms. On the flip side of the coin, 74
percent assess Russia’s influence on their country as negative. Only 4
percent consider it positive.


Ukrainians are also clear and consistent about the path they want to
follow. Asked whether they would accept peace in exchange for losing the
right to determine their own future, 80 percent said “no.” Only 5 percent
said “yes.” Despite the many pressures they are under, Ukrainians are not
willing to give up their territory: 77 percent want the occupied parts of
Donbas to be returned to Ukrainian control.


Ukraine’s path to democracy is being driven from the bottom-up, rather than
from the top-down. It is propelled by a popular determination, solidified
on the Maidan during the Revolution of Dignity, to root out corruption and
build a democratic system in which leaders serve the people, and not the
other way around. The bottom-up nature of the process means that reforms
may proceed relatively slowly, but the end result is likely to be more
sustainable.


Further, the polling demonstrates the optimism the Ukrainian people have in
the slow but steady progress they are making. By a ratio of two-to-one,
Ukrainians expect the next generation to be better off than their own. The
ratio hits to five- or six-to-one in places like Kherson in the South and
Khmelnitsky oblast and Lviv in the West. These numbers are significant
because they mean that people are willing to make sacrifices now in order
to deliver a better future for their children.


Citizens without prior experience in any kind of activism are participating
in local decision-making in ever-increasing numbers. One quarter has
attended community meetings since 2014 and a further 29 percent are willing
to do so. These would be respectable figures anywhere, but they are
particularly impressive in a country that was known, until relatively
recently, for its politically-disengaged population. In other words, the
Ukrainian people themselves are committed to the reforms that can make
Ukraine more democratic, stable and prosperous. They hold these convictions
independently of their current government and despite external pressures to
the contrary.


These findings illustrate that hostile external pressure is meeting fierce
resistance in Ukraine. At the same time, international assistance that is
offered and accepted in good faith is falling on exceedingly fertile soil.


*Recommendations*

Russia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia and the other countries of
Eurasia have been training grounds for hybrid warfare. It is thus in the US
national security interest to help the countries of Eurasia build
resilience so that they can be responsible partners in the community of
democracies rather than breeding grounds for global instability.

Which brings us to the question of how the international community can help
resist this threat. As we consider ways to address authoritarian
aggression, we should bear in mind that the trends we are seeing in Eurasia
and Europe are part of a broader pattern. Much of the world is experiencing
a rising tide of “illiberalism,” by which I mean elected regimes that
hollow out democratic structures, eliminate checks and balances on
executive power, and deprive citizens of basic rights and freedoms. The
backlash against democracy is driven by authoritarian aggression, to be
sure, but also by home-grown extremism and anti-elitism; corruption;
migration; economic inequality and insecurity; technological disruptions;
and weakened political institutions. All of these elements are powerful in
their own right, but they also feed upon and reinforce one another. We see
these tendencies in Eurasia and Europe, to be sure, but also to varying
degrees in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and Africa.

This broader global context reminds us that there is no one-stop solution
to the problem of authoritarian aggression.


I would propose that we think in terms of four large baskets of responses:

First, we need to reaffirm our transatlantic alliances and our own
commitment to democratic principles while supporting the efforts of a new
generation of democracy champions. Unless democracy’s defenders are putting
forward a compelling and positive narrative of their own, no amount of
technical fixes will make a difference.

Second, we need to strengthen democratic institutions in the affected
countries. This is the first line of defense. When governments are not
responsive to citizens and not delivering improvements to their lives,
populist and extremist appeals gain traction. This basket has several
corollaries.

We need to help citizens engage in politics, by taking civic action,
joining parties or running for office. This is particularly true for
traditionally marginalized and underrepresented groups. The impact of
information warfare is to drive people away from politics, which provides a
vacuum for extremists to fill. Ordinary people need incentives to get back
into politics to fill the political center.

Political parties need to rise above their partisan interests and take the
position, as Senator Graham said at an earlier hearing, that an attack on
one is an attack on all.

We need to fight corruption, which is simultaneously a cause, a tool, and
an effect of hybrid warfare.

Third, governments in affected countries need to treat hybrid warfare like
the urgent national security threat that it is. Anything less is to do the
aggressor’s work for him. Political leaders need to develop proactive and
whole-of-government counter-strategies. They need to communicate about
these strategies in a straightforward way with the public and enlist
public-private collaboration.

And fourth, citizens, civil society organizations, political parties,
journalists and editors need information, tools and strategies so they can
protect themselves and each other from these threats.

For example, NDI will be conducting pilot public opinion research to
determine who is most vulnerable to propaganda in target countries and to
learn the best ways of building their resilience.

More broadly, there is a need in the vulnerable countries for coalitions to
form around the goal of “taking back our elections.” These networks would
include civil society groups, political parties, governments, academics,
journalists, technology experts, and traditional and social media companies.

Depending on local circumstances, specific programs should focus on civic
education and media literacy campaigns; training for political parties,
civic watchdog groups, journalists and editors; support for investigative
journalism; strengthening and expansion of credible Russian-language news
sources; assistance for election authorities; development of norms and
standards for the integrity of online political discourse; and corporate
responsibility campaigns for traditional and social media companies.


Hybrid warfare in Eurasia is an urgent threat -- not just to Eurasia, but
to Europe and the U.S. There are courageous and tireless champions
throughout the region who are committed to defending democratic values --
Vladimir, Evgenia, Anar, Ana, Giorgi, Eka, Mustafa and Svitlana are just a
few examples. And the story of resolve and resilience from Ukraine tells us
that it *is *possible to defend against a military invasion and every other
weapon in the hybrid warfare arsenal while still building democracy, slowly
and steadily, from below.


But they cannot do it alone. Nor should they. We know from recent
experience in our own elections that the tools and techniques of hybrid
warfare being tested in Eurasia today will be deployed on our own shores
tomorrow.


From our founding days, Americans have held the conviction that to secure
the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our country, we must establish
government that derives legitimacy and power from the consent of the
people. We received the help of others in our founding, and from that point
onward have embraced the ethic of assisting those around the world who step
forward -- sometimes at great risk -- to promote, establish and sustain
democracy. We have benefited from the peace that global democratic
development produces and from the economic opportunities that it creates.


Democracy assistance as a defense against authoritarian aggression in
Eurasia remains an essential investment in sovereignty, stability and
global security