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For those who have not read last week's interesting op-ed by Tom Friedman,
the link is below. Friedman reviews professor Michael Mandelbaum's
forthcoming book, *Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold
War Era.*

Mandelbaum's argument, as relayed in Friedman's piece, is that since the
end of the Cold War U.S. foreign policy has shifted emphasis, wrongly I
presume in Mandelbaum's view, from focusing on the external behavior of
nations to their internal politics, especially in promoting democratic
order. As examples of failure, he mentions Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya.

I wrote to Tom, who had co-authored a previous book with Mandelbaum in
2011, pointing out that Mandelbaum seems to have overlooked how much the
world has changed since the Cold War. This is a much more interconnected
and interdependent place. Unlike Las Vegas, what happens today internally
in a country no longer stays there. It can impact developments far beyond
its borders; Syria is the most recent and tragic example. Mandelbaum's
argument also ignores local demands by citizens for more honest,
accountable and responsive government -- and a political voice for
themselves. The so-called third wave of democratization impacted more than
100 countries. The process has not always been easy and there have been a
number of notable examples of backsliding, but the demands for change were,
and continue to be homegrown -- not a Western export product. The U.S. and
other countries, and groups like NDI, have *responded* with solidarity and
assistance. I lamented that Mandelbaum had not spent more time on the
ground observing real world situations.

Tom wrote back that that these points were well taken and that Mandelbaum's
provocative argument could stimulate debate. He agreed that some element of
nation building abroad will be required for our own security at home. This
was the conclusion of his column.

I later sent Friedman a thoughtful assessment by NDI Asia Director Peter
Manikas, who had once served as an international human rights lawyer.
Peter rightly points out that international concern over how countries
behave internally grew out of World War II and predates the end of the Cold
War. He also asserts that Mandelbaum had chosen countries selectively and,
in some cases, wrongly. I also thought you would be interested in Peter's
note, which follows.

With best regards,

Ken


Kenneth Wollack
President
National Democratic Institute
455 Massachusetts Ave., NW, 8th Floor
Washington, DC 20001
202-728-5500 (Tel)
888-875-2887 (Fax)
email: ken@ndi.org
website: www.ndi.org


There are, I think, three major problems with the [Mandelbaum] argument.

1. Since the close of the Second World War, the concept of sovereignty has
been substantially revised (or perhaps eroded) as reflected in the numerous
treaties, conventions and statements of norms and standards related to the
protection of human rights, many of which are recognized as legal
obligations under international law. These include the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1966), the Genocide Convention (1948) as well as numerous
conventions obliging states to protect the rights of their citizens in
areas such as torture (1984); racial discrimination (1966); Apartheid
(1973); discrimination against women (1977) and many more. The underlying
premise of these legal instruments is that states have obligations beyond
their borders to promote the rights of vulnerable populations.

US policy toward human rights and democracy begin to change in the 1970s .
In 1974, for example, Congress added human rights amendments to the Foreign
assistance Act, the Mutual Assistance Act and the Trade Reform Act. In
1977, President Carter made human rights a major theme in his foreign
policy. The growing emphasis on the international obligations associated
with democracy and human rights were not confined to the US.
Democratization was a condition for the entry of Greece, Portugal and Spain
into the European Community in the 1970s. The Helsinki Final Act in 1975,
signed by 35 European and North American countries, promised "respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms..." All of these, of course, took
place during the Cold War.

2. The Cold War itself was not devoid of US interventions -covert and
overt- into the internal affairs of states, not to advance democracy but in
pursuit of other objectives. Such interventions included those in
Mozambique, Angola, Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua and arguably
Chile. Can these interventions be considered more "successful" than the
post-cold war examples to which Mandelbaum's refers ?

3. The examples Mandelbaum's uses all involve some degree of military
intervention and their connection to democratization is far from clear.
Somalia begin as a humanitarian effort, spearheaded by the UN. The failed
effort to capture Aideed was not aimed at democratizing the country but to
help ensure the success of the peacekeeping effort.
The intervention in Bosnia, likewise, was to prevent a humanitarian crisis
the included genocide. While the Dayton Agreement has led to a fragile
peace and problematic arrangements for domestic governance, the peace has
endured for over 20 years. In Afghanistan, the jury is still out. Again,
the intervention was not motivated by the desire to build democracy but to
expel the Taliban. The Bonn Agreement's provision for democratic elections
was not a US initiative, but proposed by Iran. In any case, democratic
governance was probably the only arrangement that could prove acceptable to
all the parties. In Iraq, the basis for intervention was the purported
existence of weapons of mass destruction. Haiti and Libya may present cases
more directly related to democratization efforts. The military coup that
overthrew Aristide in 1991 was the first test of the Santiago Resolution
that pledged the OAS countries to prevent unconstitutional changes of
government in the hemisphere. In Libya, the aim of US policy, never clearly
articulated, appears to have been to prevent the brutal suppression of
those who were trying to bring down a dictatorship. Mandelbaum, though,
appears to be less concerned about the military interventions than the
state building efforts that followed. To help rebuild a functioning state
in the aftermath of a military conflict is inarguably difficult. But what
are the options? What would Afghanistan look like if no such efforts had
been made? Would Haiti be better off absent continuing US efforts to build
a functioning, more democratic government?

In summary, it seems to me that the growing emphasis on democracy and human
rights is a gradual development with roots in the experience of the Second
World War; there are few examples of US military interventions based
principally on the desire to promote democracy; and efforts to rebuild
countries along democratic principles in the aftermath of violent conflict
are inherently difficult, will not always be successful but are essential
elements in stabilizing war torn societies.


http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/opinion/impossible-missions.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fthomas-l-friedman&action=click&contentCollection=opinion®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection&_r=