EMAIL DETAILS

I thought you would be interested in this brief trip report from
Burma/Myanmar by NDI's Asia Regional Director, Peter Manikas.

Best regards,

Ken
Kenneth Wollack
President
National Democratic Institute
455 Massachusetts Ave., NW
8th Floor
Washington, DC 20001
Tel. No. 202-728-5500
Email: ken@ndi.org
www.ndi.org

Sent from my iPhone. Please excuse auto-correct mishaps and typos.

Begin forwarded message:


The following is a brief update following my trip last week.

Much has improved during the past five years-Yangon is experiencing a
building boom, political parties and civil society operate freely and
most restrictions on free expression have been removed. The
by-elections of 2012 and general elections of 2015 were largely
transparent and viewed as a credible reflection of popular will. But
the transition from military rule is far from complete; the military
retains control of key ministries such as Defence, Home and Border
Affairs; 25 percent of all legislative seats are reserved for the
military. And the military still holds a large stake in the country's
economy. The transition, in fact, is still in its early stages and may
take several years to complete.

Human Rights and the Peace Process

Last October militants in Rakhine launched an attack against police
and army forces stationed there and the military's response, by many
accounts, was excessively brutal. Aung San Suu Kyi's (ASSK) government has
denied allegations that the army committed massive human rights abuses
but the incident has badly damaged ASSK's international reputation and
raised questions as to whether the military is operating without the
approval of the civilian government, or alternatively, whether the NLD
(National League for Democracy) government actually condones the
military's response. In either case, the signs are troubling. There
will likely be further difficulties ahead. The International Crisis
Group recently issued a report that documents the growing influence of
Middle East extremists on the growing militancy in Rakhine.

The peace process was given a boost with the initiation of the
Panglong II conference last year. The conference, named after the
peace agreement Aung San initiated in 1947, was the first in a series
of meetings designed to culminate in a peace accord. However several
of the key warring factions did not participate or walked out of the
conference early. Fighting continues in northern Shan State, Kuchin
and in pockets throughout the ethnic states. There are no indications
that a peace accord will be completed in the near future.

Constitutional Reform

Talk of constitutional reform has diminished since the 2015 elections
but seems likely to revive before the next general elections in 2020.
There is widespread agreement that the peace process and constitutional
reform are intertwined. The resolution of key constitutional issues such as
federalism and the role of the military
are seen as the desired by-product of a negotiated peace settlement. The
two are linked in still another way: the military maintains that its
current constitutional role in government must be retained until a peace
agreement is reached.

The dilemma for the government is that to achieve its constitutional reform
goals, the peace process must be its top priority. Yet it is not the
priority of most Burmese who live outside the conflict zones. Their most
pressing concern is the pace of economic development, and according to
many, that pace is disappointingly slow.


Political Developments

While ASSK remains enormously popular, there are growing signs of
discontent with her and the NLD's leadership. MP's at every level of
government are ruled with an iron hand; the party line enforced by
five party whips. The chief whip, and the most feared, is Win Thein, who is
not an elected represented but is a co-founder of the NLD and a confidant
of ASSK (he also is a longtime friend of NDI). The more accomplished NLD
legislators bristle under the rigid discipline of the party and resent the
lack of opportunity to help shape party policy (there is, for example, no
party caucus).

Perhaps even more troubling, there has been no apparent efforts to build
the party and develop a second tier leadership who could someday take the
party's reins.

Discontent is manifesting itself outside the party, as well. Generation 88
leaders have announced their intention of forming a new party, which would
compete on at least a limited basis, in the 2020 elections. Whether this
new party will present itself as somehow
supplementing or directly challenging the NLD is unclear.

Despite the signs of unease within the NLD and among its supporters, the
military-backed USDP (Union Solidarity Development Party) shows
no signs of increased strength nor heightened popularity. It is not
expected to perform well in the upcoming by-elections where only 19
legislative seats are at stake.

NDI's Work

I met with the Speakers of the upper and lower Houses of Parliament
and their expressions of gratitude and support of NDI's work seemed
genuine and sincere. Clearly NDI's work in building relationships in Naypyitaw
has paid substantial dividends. An MOU with both houses will be signed in
early February. NDI's Parliamentary Resource Center has become a valued
venue for the legislature's leadership as well as for ordinary MPs from all
political parties. I addition to the skills
building trainings on topics such as public speaking and conducting
internet-based research, the Center also offers seminars on specific
topics to be considered by parliament. Recently, the Center has also
provided a venue at which MPs can interact with civil society
representatives.

In Yangon, NDI continues its work with PACE, the nation's premier election
observer group, which is now preparing to observe the upcoming
by-elections. NDI is also assisting PACE develop an electoral reform
advocacy strategy and exploring new areas of activity, such as
parliamentary monitoring.


Peter M. Manikas
Director of Asia Program