EMAIL DETAILS

In light of our discussions.

>
> The J-curve hits the Middle East
>
> By Ian Bremmer
> Published: February 16 2011 20:28 | Last updated: February 16 2011
> 20:28
>
> No one could predict that the death of a Tunisian vegetable vendor
> would spark revolts across the Middle East, threatening regimes from
> Libya to Iran. But while these shockwaves might seem chaotic, they
> are in fact only the latest example of a powerful political
> phenomenon: the J-curve, or the dip in stability as countries move
> from closed to open societies. The concept also explains why many of
> the region’s governments are now caught in what may prove to be an
> inescapable trap.
>
> EDITOR’S CHOICE
> Martin Wolf: Egypt has history on its side - Feb-15
>
> Opinion: From Tahrir Square to democracy - Feb-14
>
> Egyptian military takes firmer control - Feb-13
>
> Comment: Signs autocrats must watch for - Feb-14
>
> Gideon Rachman: Reflections on the Revolution in Egypt - Feb-14
>
> Analysis: Egypt: Evolution of an uprising - Feb-13
>
> The theory goes like this. If you plot the relationship between a
> country’s stability (on the vertical axis) and its social and
> political openness (on the horizontal axis) the points that mark
> every possible combination of openness and stability will produce a
> pattern that resembles the letter J. Most countries start off closed
> and stable (think: North Korea). Many end up open and stable (like
> Britain). But in between there is a turbulent transition. Some
> governments, such as post-apartheid South Africa, survive this
> transition. Others – the Soviet Union, Iran under the shah and the
> former Yugoslavia – do not.
>
> This presents a dilemma for the Middle East. In recent years,
> globalisation has provided more young Arabs with access to
> education, media and travel – innovations that make it more
> difficult for a ruling elite to control information and power. If
> governments, such as Egypt’s, relax their grip to stoke economic
> growth (by opening their societies to deeper integration with the
> outside world) they risk sharp social and political upheaval. Yet if
> they keep things closed, they sharply limit the power of their
> economies to generate the prosperity on which longer-term political
> legitimacy will depend. And that too creates instability.
>
> The J-curve is a controversial idea. When I first floated it in
> 2006, it was used – in some ways hijacked – by those seeking to
> explain the unstable postwar environment in Iraq. But an
> intervention bringing democracy by force was always a poor example
> of the theory. The current upheavals in the Middle East, the result
> of internal dynamics of populations trapped between economic
> hardship and increasing political openness, make a much better test.
>
> Most regimes in the Middle East and north Africa have tried to
> remain stable by cutting off their citizens from the modern world.
> Globalisation’s progress has been slow across the region. But over
> the past decade these efforts have come undone. People have taken up
> mobile phones, watched satellite television and switched on Facebook
> and Twitter. Autocratic governments, in turn, have had to expend
> more and more effort containing these potent weapons of free
> expression.
>
> It is true there are obvious counterexamples to this trend. Some
> strongly authoritarian regimes have avoided significant domestic
> pressures, because strong economic growth has effectively pushed up
> the entire J-curve. After 30 years of state-directed growth, China
> is under much less internal political pressure than the Middle
> Eastern regimes. Nonetheless, China’s leadership is keenly aware
> that economic success is required to maintain the regime’s survival
> – an implicit admission that openness and order remain in tension
> underneath.
>
> Given the Middle East is unlikely to see a new economic miracle,
> what should its pressurised leaders do? They face two options. Those
> with the most isolated populations can repress them, hoping to stay
> on the left of the curve. Leaders of Algeria, Iran and Yemen now
> ride to and fro upon tigers that they dare not dismount, as Winston
> Churchill once put it. Ultimately, that is a dangerous ride – as
> Tunisia’s Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali can attest.
>
> But opening up reform – the Jordanian route – is risky too. It costs
> King Abdullah little to replace one prime minister, but new faces
> alone will not create jobs or prosperity. Real reform will be much
> riskier, as it requires a surrender of some state control. King
> Abdullah must now calculate whether he is more likely to survive as
> a real reformer or as the man who kept the genie in the bottle for
> another year.
>
> No countries are watching Jordan more keenly than Saudi Arabia,
> Kuwait and a currently restive Bahrain. Unrest in their neighbour
> will make all three more cautious about allowing citizens to speak
> their minds. With oil and gas to export – and smaller populations
> with which to share the spoils – these three are actually better
> placed to begin sweeping reform. But, looking back to Tunisia, even
> the region’s richest now know a single spark can ignite a country.
> Even those who can best afford the instability that accompanies the
> depths of the J-curve may be too fearful to begin the journey.
>
> The writer is the president of Eurasia Group and author of “The End
> of the Free Market”
>
>