EMAIL DETAILS
SUBJECT:
Treasurer should ban ASX takeover - Australian
PRI: NORMAL
FROM:
M
mandrews@ips.edu
DATE:
2011-01-03 14:58:00
MSG_ID:
<4689508B-3412-44BF-A520-1056681365BA@ips.edu>
RECIPIENTS:
TO:
C
Curtis Hastings
<curt@ips.edu>
D
Devon Archer
<darcher@rosemontseneca.com>
E
Eric Schwerin
<eschwerin@rosemontseneca.com>
H
Hunter Biden
<hbiden@rosemontseneca.com>
N
Neil Callahan
<ncallahan@rosemontseneca.com>
CONTENT:
TEXT: YES |
HTML: YES
PROCESSED
It is an interesting development that Australians are making an argument and perhaps it is to press for more control. Treasurer should ban ASX takeover Peter Swan From:The Australian January 04, 2011 12:00AM Increase Text Size Decrease Text Size Print Email Share WILL Treasurer Wayne Swan reject the ASX-SGX acquisition by Singapore the way Peter Costello rejected Shell's acquisition of Woodside on grounds of national interest? He should. The act gives virtually complete discretion to the Treasurer and Foreign Investment Review Board: "The government determines what is 'contrary to the national interest' by having regard to the widely held community concerns of Australians." A poll conducted by UMR showed most Australians of all political persuasions were opposed to the acquisition. Although the FIRB rejects only a negligible number of applications, it is more common for applications to be withdrawn, perhaps because unacceptable changes are required. Clearly, the ASX is concerned. It has commissioned a report from Access Economics "for ASX Limited". Thus, significantly, Access Economics does not position itself as giving an "independent" report. RELATED COVERAGE Building bigger pools of funds The Australian, 17 Dec 2010 Swan not convinced on ASX takeover Herald Sun, 16 Dec 2010 ACCC green light on ASX takeover Herald Sun, 15 Dec 2010 ACCC open to exchange takeover The Australian, 15 Dec 2010 ASX bid moves to the political court The Australian, 15 Dec 2010 The main argument put forward is that the link will develop Australia as a regional financial hub by lowering the cost of capital "through increased scale, liquidity and diversification". I find this puzzling, as all the indications are it will achieve quite the reverse. Make no bones about it, a small exchange (Singapore) with a free float market capitalisation of $US179 billion in 2009 is acquiring the five-fold bigger ASX with capitalisation of $952bn. Yet Singapore will have 11 of the director positions and Australia only four. If scale economies provide an overwhelming advantage then I would expect ASX to acquire SGX, not the other way round. A rather inferior minnow expects to acquire a floundering whale. The Australian Financial Centre Forum created by the Australian government reports a liquidity (turnover) ranking of all Asian exchanges. Australia is ranked seventh with a turnover rate of about 125 per cent per annum, and Singapore 12th out of 15 with a turnover rate of about 75 per cent. . A comparable city-state, Hong Kong, has a liquidity rate of about 90 per cent and market capitalisation twice that of Singapore. Hence, what chance will Australia have to become a major regional hub with its trading platform controlled by an exchange that has implemented designs making it one of the world's most illiquid? The second-highest ranked exchange is South Korea with a liquidity/ turnover rate of about 200 per cent. Much of South Korea's success hinges on it being the most transparent market in the world. It has achieved this by providing broker identities publicly in real time, for all trades to all traders. Consequently, prices reflect all available information, since signals of informed-trader identities are implicit in broker identities, thus the otherwise uninformed replicate their trades. The virtual elimination of asymmetric information and provision of counterparty information ensures that the uninformed trade with greater confidence, considerably boosting trading volume and liquidity. Spreads are much lower after taking account of the much greater private information contained in trades due to more efficient price discovery. It is tragic that until November 2005 the ASX possessed a trading system almost as good as South Korea's, the difference being that the ASX provided broker identities to other brokers but not to traders universally. Naturally, this gave smaller and private client brokers a considerable boost at the expense of the dominant institutional brokers. When capitulating to the institutional brokers, instead of adopting the much fairer South Korean system, the ASX abolished broker identities completely. This was at great cost to efficiency, trade volume and liquidity on the exchange. Why is Australia performing poorly as a financial hub? According to the Forum, one of the main culprits is the ASX in its multiple roles as market operator, central counterparty and market supervisor providing a significant barrier to competition and innovation. By contrast, the new entrant in waiting, Chi-X, has a market share in Europe equal to Euronext, has responded to requirements for latency facilitating high-speed transactions, and provides lower transaction charges for liquidity providers in the limit order book relative to market orders to encourage greater liquidity. Access Economics argues regulators elsewhere have approved similar exchange combinations, such as Euronext. I agree these combinations have been successful in improving competition. But a strong or successful exchange usually acquires a weaker one. For example, the NYSE has acquired Euronext, and NASDAQ has acquired OMX, the regional Nordic combination. These aggregations are dissimilar to ASX-SGX, an acquisition by the tiny and underperforming Singapore Exchange. Control ultimately rests with a foreign government, which must aim to create its Singaporean hub at the expense of Australia. European aggregations are quite different. The ASX proposes to sell itself to an overseas exchange/foreign power without any say-so from its shareholders. It is unique among Australian companies and, doubtless, among major exchanges in that its shareholders have no effective say. There is a 15 per cent ceiling on shareholding that prevents any takeover without Australian government approval. Consequently, the law prohibits hostile takeovers, effectively insulating the ASX management from market forces and doubtless severely depressing the stock price into the bargain. Fortunately, from the perspective of ASX, the relevant section of the Corporations Act does not need to be repealed for the acquisition to take place, but a regulatory change subject to parliamentary veto is required. Should the opposition, the Greens and independents oppose in line with public opinion, the minority government could face serious obstacles in approving the Singaporean acquisition. I propose that the government announce it will approve all acquisitions under the Corporations Act, effectively lifting the ban on hostile acquisitions, adding greatly to shareholder value in the process. In order to provide a window in which market takeover forces can operate, the FIRB should either ban Singapore's acquisition outright or postpone consideration of the Singapore acquisition by a minimum of a year and in the meantime permit new competitive entry. In this way, the ASX gets a chance to get its house in order while subject to hostile threat. The nation will benefit and, most likely, ASX shareholders as well, of which I am one. Only after a time in which market forces are allowed to operate could there be any similarity between the formation of exchange groupings in Europe and Singapore's bid. The ASX is a former icon immune from market forces that wishes to cut and run at the first sign of competition. Peter Swan is professor in the school of banking and finance in the Australian School of Business, University of NSW.
METADATA:
THREAD:
INDEX:
AdhhocgnlKKBzEFxRVKR9mQlfV8Xzw==