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Following is an insightful report, prepared by Dilek Ertukel, NDI's
resident director in Ankara, on recent political developments in Turkey.

With best regards,

Ken


Kenneth Wollack
President
National Democratic Institute
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Washington, DC 20001
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email: ken@ndi.org
website: www.ndi.org


NDI Field Report on Post-Coup Political Environment in Turkey: August 31,
2016

The people of Turkey overcame a serious coup attempt on July 15. Some 250
citizens died and more than 2000 were injured. For a large swath of
society, the coup was seen as an assault on the country and its people.
According to a KONDA survey, 53 percent of citizens who resisted the coup
and maintained nightly vigils afterward saw the events as an attempt to
occupy, divide, and weaken Turkey, compared to just 17 percent who said it
was an attempt to bring down the President. The hundreds of thousands of
unarmed citizens who took action are celebrated as national heroes and
universally credited with the coup’s failure. The survey also shows these
citizens were diverse in ethnicity, political affiliation, gender, depth of
religious faith, age, and occupation. Seventy-seven percent had never
participated in a protest or demonstration before; 56 percent belong to no
political party; and 81 percent belong to no civil society organization.

Emerging from the trauma is a more emboldened and nationalist state of
mind. Domestic and foreign policy actions adopted by the government since
July 15 enjoy broad public support, beyond the base of the ruling Justice
and Development Party (AKP). That President Recep Erdogan nearly escaped
assassination and MPs from all parties stood vigil as the parliament
building was bombed has brought greater respect to Erdogan, opposition
parties, and the national legislature. In a rally on August 7, five million
people gathered together with the President, leaders of two main opposition
parties, and the armed forces command to celebrate democracy and honor the
dead. In message and symbolism, the event was used to herald the beginning
of Turkey’s “resurgence as a greater and more unified nation.”

The government’s priority is to rid society of Fethullah Gulen’s influence.
Few in Turkey doubt it was the Pennsylvania-based cleric, and officers
loyal to him, who led the coup -- as part of a decades-long effort to claim
power through infiltration of government and social institutions by
non-transparent, non-electoral and/or unconstitutional means. Approximately
80,000 people have been dismissed, brought under investigation, and/or
arrested under the current three-month state of emergency. Raids and
arrests of suspected Gulen leaders and supporters have created a collective
sense of “good riddance” amongst the majority of the public. Human rights
groups and the media, while continuing to defend journalists arrested for
alleged support of the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), have been silent on
the fate of more than 40 journalists brought into custody and/or arrested
for alleged collaboration with Gulen.

The events of July 15 revealed serious weaknesses in the country’s
democracy, governing system, intelligence services and military, rousing
deep concern for Turkey’s national security, economic welfare, and overall
stability. Intensified PKK and ISIL terror in the last month, including the
attempted assassination of People’s Republican Party (CHP) leader Kemal
Kilicdaroğlu, resulted in the death of nearly 300 civilians and security
personnel in the last month. Attempting to stave off mounting threats,
leaders of AKP and opposition CHP and National Movement Party (MHP) are
communicating and engaging constructively at an unprecedented level. The
Kurdish-based People’s Democracy Party (HDP) has been sidelined; parties
say they are unwilling to work with HDP as long as its alleged ties with
the PKK are maintained.

There is broad consensus on the need to restructure the government in the
interest of greater stability and strengthened democracy. A multi-party
process for a new constitution has been launched, and parties appear to be
negotiating fruitfully on a judicial reform package. In the short term,
however, judges and prosecutors are bound by a constitution that holds the
interests and security of the state above the rights and freedoms of
individuals. The government must also hire a large number of judges,
prosecutors and investigators to replace those dismissed or arrested, in
addition to hiring numerous police, special forces personnel and senior
military officers to fill key positions in the fight against terror.
Initiatives to strengthen the economy are also underway, focused on shoring
up Turkey’s standing with creditors, increasing foreign cash flow and
investment, and repairing trade relations.

Concurrently, on the international stage, Turkey’s relations with the
United States and Europe are extremely tense. Contrasting narratives
between what people in Turkey experienced and how it was represented in the
West have fueled suspicions of Western ambitions to weaken Turkey. Gülen’s
continued presence in Pennsylvania, the US alliance with the PYD (Kurdish
forces in Syria) in the fight against ISIL, and Europe’s ambivalence
towards Turkey’s EU membership and handling of the refugee crisis all
appear to be driving Turkey towards a foreign policy approach that secures
a more independent geopolitical position and garners greater respect for
its culture and security interests. Notwithstanding the intensity of
feelings, government officials are eager to find new ground for cooperation
with the US. Vice President Biden took important steps to improve relations
during his recent visit to Ankara; however, the question of Gülen’s
extradition is likely to remain a flashpoint in relations for the near
term.

Collectively, these developments signal a consolidation of statist
interests and Turkish identity. Had the coup succeeded, citizens believe it
would have destroyed the state they hold sacred. Events have also
reaffirmed citizens’ commitment to democracy, at least to their right to
determine their own government. Parliament’s newfound respectability has
led to greater confidence in the parliamentary system as a whole, putting
to bed prospects of a presidential system for the immediate term. CHP is
showing renewed confidence and appears to have set aside its “just say no”
approach in favor of constructive opposition and promotion of alternative
solutions. These are hopeful signs that a more democratic path may be open
to Turkey. On the other hand, the lack of concern for human rights when
state or ideological interests are at risk suggests that democratic values
have yet to take root in Turkish culture, politics, and governance.

Turkey’s friends in the US should seek out opportunities to engage with a
wide spectrum of officials, citizens and institutions on a range of issues,
while continuing to reinforce the expectation of Turkey’s respect for human
rights and international law. These steps would contribute to a better
understanding of the cross-cutting political, social, religious, cultural
and psychological complexities of Turkey while also building confidence
that there is appreciation for Turkey’s challenges. This, in turn, would
allow Turkey’s friends to play a more constructive role in supporting
democratic outcomes.

NDI Programming in Turkey:

Turkish society is deeply divided and ineffective at holding its government
accountable. Since 1997, NDI has sought to facilitate consensus across
partisan divides, empower civil society to recognize shared interests and
work together, and help activists develop constructive approaches to civic
organizing and advocacy. Over the past five years, in partnership with the
Istanbul Policy Center at Sabanci University (IPC), NDI facilitated the
formation of Turkey’s largest and most diverse nonpartisan civic movement,
the Checks and Balances Network (CBN or the Network). Consisting of nearly
300 organizations, the Network has built a presence in all 81 provinces of
Turkey. Representing the full spectrum of ethnic, religious, and political
backgrounds, as well as a range of issue areas, CBN members, including
political party activists and leaders, have demonstrated that reaching
consensus and working in coalition for democratic reform is possible,
despite Turkey’s entrenched polarization.

Since coining the Turkish phrase for “checks and balances” in 2011, the
Network has succeeded in introducing the concept into the political
discourse among leaders from both ruling and opposition parties. NDI has
supported CBN members in submitting recommendations to Parliament for
constitutional reform, conducting national and local advocacy campaigns,
and building the Network’s civic organizing presence in all seven regions.
The Network’s advocacy and decision maker engagement strategy has succeeded
in putting new issues on the political agenda and shaping discourse among
political and media elites. However, given recent political upheaval, the
challenge now is to help to bridge social and political divisions by
actively engaging ordinary citizens, providing them opportunities to
participate constructively in politics and ultimately build pressure from
below for democratic reforms. The Network aims to reach beyond its members
to involve large numbers of ordinary citizens in its campaigns. The
Institute is currently working with CBN members to expand their use of
online platforms and tools to engage a broader range of citizens in reform
discussions across the country.

Moving forward, the sensitivities of the political environment, including
the conflict in the southeast as well as the government’s investigation of
the July 15 coup attempt, will need to be taken into account. People are
hesitant to engage in broad public activities that could be viewed as
critical of the government. Programs will need a cautious, flexible and
low-profile approach, using private, smaller-scale discussions to identify
openings for constructive dialogue as the country tackles major questions
of reform