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I thought you would be interested in last week's testimonies by NDI's Chris
Fomunyoh before the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs
committees. The statement below before the House committee examines Boko
Haram and other threats in Northern Nigeria. The subsequent statement
before the Senate committee focuses on the links between governance and
security in sub-Saharan Africa.

With best regards,

Ken


Kenneth Wollack
President
National Democratic Institute
455 Massachusetts Ave., NW, 8th Floor
Washington, DC 20001
202-728-5500 (Tel)
888-875-2887 (Fax)
email: ken@ndi.org
website: www.ndi.org


*Statement of Christopher Fomunyoh, Ph.D.*
*Senior Associate and Regional Director for Central and West Africa*
*National Democratic Institute*

*U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs*
*Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights and
International Organizations*

*“The U.S. Role in Helping Nigeria Confront Boko Haram and Other Threats in
Northern Nigeria”*

*May 11, 2016*

Mr. Chairman, ranking member Ms. Bass, and members of the Subcommittee, on
behalf of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), I appreciate the
opportunity to discuss current security challenges and threats in Northern
Nigeria.


Since Nigeria’s 1999 transition from military to civilian rule, NDI has
worked closely with Nigerian legislators, political party leaders and civil
society activists to support democratic institutions and practices in the
country. With funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID), the U.S. Department of State, the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED), the Ford Foundation and U.K.’s Department for International
Development (DFID), NDI’s work has helped support Nigerian efforts to
advance democratic governance and electoral processes that reflect the will
of the people.


*I. Current Challenges Facing Northern Nigeria *

In May 2015, Nigeria’s newly elected President, Muhammadu Buhari, took
office following elections that saw the country’s first peaceful transfer
of power from one political party to another. President Buhari and his
government inherited several major economic and security challenges,
particularly in the country’s northern states, where approximately 40,000
people had been killed by violence between 2011 and 2015.[1] The region has
experienced political and economic marginalization, unbalanced development,
corruption, and poor delivery of public services.


North East Nigeria has also borne the brunt of the ongoing surge of violent
extremism. Boko Haram, a group that promotes a fundamentalist religious
ideology, has caused nearly 15,000 deaths since 2009. Moreover, more than
2.2 million Nigerians are internally displaced, with approximately 200,000
others now refugees in neighboring countries.[2] Also, the vast majority of
approximately 5.4 million people in need emergency food assistance across
the Lake Chad basin region are Nigerian, as Boko Haram related violence has
devastated infrastructure and disrupted economic activity.[3] Human Rights
Watch estimates that over 2,000 schools in northern Nigeria and the Lake
Chad basin countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger have closed or been
destroyed by the Boko Haram insurgency.[4] In March 2015, Boko Haram
pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), declaring
itself the Islamic State’s West Africa Province.


Since May 2015, the Nigerian military, in tandem with a multinational
military task force comprising troops from Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin,
has scored military successes against Boko Haram, reclaiming much of the
group’s self-described “Islamic Caliphate” that, at one time, spanned
roughly 20,000 square miles (twice the size of the state of Maryland).
Despite losses on the battlefield, Boko Haram remains a potent force and
continues to stage attacks against “soft” targets such as markets and
refugee camps. Approximately 3,350 people have been killed by Boko Haram
since May 2015.[5]


Besides the Boko Haram crisis in the North East, intercommunal conflicts
between agrarian and pastoralist communities have caused 6,000 deaths since
2011, about 600 of which have occurred since the beginning of this year.[6] A
2015 report by Mercy Corps, a U.S. based organization, found that violence
has contributed to negative economic growth and that Nigeria could gain
approximately $13.7 billion dollars a year in macroeconomic activity in the
four most affected states were it not for the agrarian-pastoralist conflict.
[7] The communities most affected are in northern and central Nigeria and
the Middle Belt (stretching from Kwara and Niger states in the west to
Adamawa state in the east). Recently, intercommunal skirmishes have
occurred in the country’s South East zone, underscoring the national
ramifications of simmering tensions and violence.[8]


*II. Conflicts Underpinned by Governance Gaps in Northern Nigeria*

The enduring catalyst of violent intercommunal conflicts can be
attributable in large part to challenges in governance and extremely poor
delivery of public services.


● The North-South divide in development

According to Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics, as of 2010 (prior to
the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency), approximately 69 percent of
Nigerians in the North East lived on less than a dollar per day.[9] The
violence of these past years has exacerbated the situation, as
infrastructure has been dilapidated, investment has dried up, and local
economic activity has been undermined. Poverty levels in Nigeria’s North
East and North West zones are estimated to be 40 percent higher than in the
country’s South West zone, and unemployment levels three times higher.[10] In
April 2014, a cabinet Minister described the North East’s troubles as “an
inclusion problem,” acknowledging that “the human development indicators in
that part of the country are among the lowest.”[11]


● Access to land and water resources

At the heart of the conflict between Nigeria’s agrarian and pastoralist
communities is a competition for increasingly scarce land and water
resources. As a result of the surge in demographics and urbanization, land
use now encroaches on traditional grazing routes and water sources
previously used exclusively by pastoralists, thereby bringing pastoralists
and agrarian communities into closer contact within a more competitive
environment. Climate change is also expanding desertification across the
Sahel region, and is pushing herdsmen and their cattle further south,
putting greater strain on land and water resources in those parts of the
country too.


● Convergence of criminal activity and proliferation of small arms
and light weapons

Attacks on agrarian communities by pastoral-affiliated groups across the
Middle Belt and incidences of cattle rustling have led to a vicious cycle
of revenge attacks on neighboring communities. At the same time, the rising
price of beef in West Africa has made cattle theft a lucrative enterprise
for criminal gangs that steal and transport cattle to markets, sometimes
across national borders. It is alleged that Boko Haram elements have also
participated and benefited from some of the illicit trade in cattle.
Recently, the Borno state government shut down four major cattle markets in
an attempt to choke cash flow to the group.[12]


The Boko Haram insurgency and violence from intercommunal rivalries between
pastoralists and the agrarian community have been fueled in part by the
proliferation of small arms coming across Nigeria’s porous borders,
particularly since the fall of Muammar Khaddafi and his regime in Libya in
2011. According to the New York Times,[13] last month the U.S. military
intercepted a weapons convoy from Libya that was bound for the Lake Chad
region and seized small caliber weapons, rifles and machine guns. As Boko
Haram loses the military battle and splinters into small cells, many
Nigerians are fearful that some of its fighters will create criminal
networks within the pastoralist communities that could potentially continue
to carry out intermittent attacks on agrarian communities.


● Non-inclusive governance

Nigeria is a Federation of over 500 ethnic groups and local languages;
however, there is a perception that the country’s governance, especially at
the local and state levels, lags behind in responding to the needs and
grievances of ethnic minorities in the different localities. Moreover, it
is notable that in Nigeria, political power provides privileged access to
state resources and other economic advantages. In the north, the very
visible disparity in wealth and wellbeing between the haves and the have
nots has created extreme frustrations and a cycle of resentment.


By some accounts, attempts to adopt Sharia law in parts of Nigeria in 1999
stemmed, in part, from the belief among sizable segments of the population
in northern states of Nigeria that strict adherence to Islamic law could
help ‘cleanse the corrupt political system.’ Although 12 Northern states
adopted a dual system of Sharia and common law, living conditions in the
states did not change as corruption and neglect persisted. One of the
battle cries of Boko Haram’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf, around 2009 was that
Northern elites had co-opted Sharia law. In recent interviews with Mercy
Corps, former Boko Haram members asserted that widespread frustration with
the government led to their initial embrace of the insurgency. Close to 50
percent of respondents also claimed that their communities supported Boko
Haram at some point in hopes that the insurrection would bring about a
change in governance within their communities. As one former youth member
explained, “we have lost faith in any government assistance.”[14]


● Weak representation

In the Middle Belt, minority communities that migrated into the area
centuries ago in search of economic opportunities now are discriminated
against and face enormous challenges accessing resources and influencing
decision-making. The principle of “indigenization” -- the idea derived from
an interpretation of the 1999 constitution that certain economic and
political rights belong solely to the original inhabitants of an area --
has created yet another barrier to the rights of certain communities to own
property in the communities in which they live or access public
universities at low costs or run for public office. This has exacerbated
intercommunal competition and conflicts in a number of Nigerian states.


● Marginalization of women and youth

Women and youth constitute the highest demographic blocks in Northern
Nigeria, yet they are also the most marginalized. For example, in the North
East geopolitical zone, 61 percent of all women and girls are illiterate --
the highest rate in the country.[15] Women in Northern Nigeria are also
disproportionately disengaged from the political process. Northern Nigeria
only allowed full women's suffrage in 1979 -- 19 years after Nigeria gained
independence and granted women the right to vote.[16]


Youth have limited access to education and economic opportunities. At 48.9
percent, Northern Nigeria has the lowest youth literacy rates in the
country, far below the national average of 80 percent.[17] Also, of
Nigeria’s 10.5 million children of primary school-age that are out of
school, 60 percent live in northern states.[18] Some of these children
attend Quranic schools that do not necessarily meet the standards of
Nigeria’s national education curriculum.[19] These youth will have even
fewer opportunities for higher education and gainful employment, and thus,
could be more vulnerable to recruitment into extremist movements.


Boko Haram has recruited women and youth, sometimes forcibly through
kidnappings and coercion. In the Mercy Corp study referenced above, many
former combatants stated that a leading motivation for joining the group
was the belief that Boko Haram would provide loans to start or expand
business opportunities.[20]


*III. The Way Forward*

To its credit, the Buhari government has made a commitment to tackle these
challenges. In his inaugural address, President Buhari clearly identified
the fight against corruption and insecurity, and the reviving of the
Nigerian economy as the main priorities for his administration. On the
security front, he reassigned the Military Command and Control Centre base
to Maiduguri in Borno state, the epicenter of the Boko Haram crisis. He
also replaced the military’s top leadership or service chiefs and has
strengthened intelligence-sharing and coordination with the neighboring
countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. This strategic shift has facilitated
the creation of the Multinational Joint Task Force.


On the other hand, the government has been slower in responding to the
increasing violence in the Middle Belt, fueled by the crisis between
agrarian and pastoralist communities, even as situation has escalated in
recent months. Only in April did President Buhari finally state that
stopping the violence is a priority and ordered the police and military to
“take all necessary action to stop the carnage.”[21]


The Buhari government has also implemented several humanitarian
interventions to provide immediate assistance to communities in Northern
Nigeria. The National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA) is providing
food and other basic assistance to IDPs in camps, although less than 10
percent of IDPs live in camps.[22]


In January 2016, President Buhari created a Presidential Committee on North
East Initiatives tasked with overseeing humanitarian responses and
long-term development planning and coordinating initiatives such as the
Safe Schools Initiative and the Victims Support Fund. The Presidential
Committee has received support, grants and donations from governmental
agencies, non-governmental organizations and philanthropists.


Earlier this year, some members of the Nigerian National Assembly
introduced a bill to create the North East Development Commission (NEDC),
similar to the body instituted almost two decades ago to address
underdevelopment and conflict in the Niger Delta region. It is projected
that should the bill become law, the NEDC would develop policies and
guidelines for the development of the North East, and implement sustainable
development programs across all sectors in the region.


With Boko Haram possibly in its last throes after recent battlefield
successes by the Nigerian and regional militaries and as Nigeria and its
development partners reflect on concrete measures to revive and
rehabilitate the North East zone, urgent steps should be taken to address
the underlying grievances and deprivations that triggered or fueled the
above-referenced crises.


● Expedite the creation of a comprehensive development agency for
North East Nigeria - The government of Nigeria should expedite the creation
of the NEDC in order to better coordinate the mobilization and allocation
of resources to rebuilding and rehabilitating broken and desperate homes in
the North East.


● Prioritize long-term economic development - Nigeria should
prioritize economic recovery programs that can improve livelihoods and
facilitate investments in sectors such as agriculture, mining and
infrastructural development that can lay the foundations for sustainable
long-term economic growth and development.


● Review the legal framework on indigenization and land access - The
Nigerian Federal government and lawmakers should consider amendments to the
Grazing Reserve Law of 1965 that would establish formal grazing routes.
Representatives of agrarian and pastoralist communities should be included
in conversations on new approaches to land use planning. Similarly, Nigeria
would need to review its indigenization policy in order to foster
harmonious co-existence among communities and avenues for equal access to
effective participation in politics, governance and economic opportunity
for all its citizens irrespective of their state or local government area
(LGA) of birth and/or residence.


● Introduce stronger, citizen-centered approaches to state and local
governance - State and local government institutions should be strengthened
and should be adequately resourced to better respond to the needs of
citizens and deliver critical public services such as healthcare and
education at the grassroots level in the communities that need them the
most.


● Further professionalization of security services - Nigeria should
design and implement holistic counterinsurgency strategies that include
components of community policing and demobilization and rehabilitation of
former combatants in the North East. Similarly, in the Middle Belt,
security responses should focus on policing and dismantling of criminal
networks, and creating mediation and conflict prevention committees at the
state and LGA levels. Nigeria’s security forces must ensure their actions
do not come at the expense of human rights and the rule of law.

● Strengthen and diversify regional cooperation into the economic and
development sphere - Although Boko Haram was a Nigerian problem at
inception, it has morphed into a sub-regional security threat for countries
in the Lake Chad basin, taking advantage of porous borders and fluid
migration patterns of population groups along national borders. As
combating Boko Haram has required a coordinated multi-national approach
involving intelligence sharing, joint cross-border operations and continued
capacity support to security services from Cameroon, Chad and Niger through
the Multinational Joint Task Force, so should addressing the humanitarian
crisis require economic and infrastructural development that integrates the
socio-economic interests of these neighboring countries.


● Support rehabilitation and resiliency of impacted communities and
individuals - Resources should be allocated for the rehabilitation of
former combatants and victims of Boko Haram or other forms of violence as
well as communities impacted by these heinous attacks. These efforts should
also include sustained mental health programs to address the long lasting
effects of trauma and youth radicalization by extremist groups and other
negative forces.


● Promote women and youth as agents of peace - More women and youth
should be included in rehabilitation and peacebuilding and recovery
processes to render these processes more inclusive, effective and
sustainable. Specific funding mechanisms should be dedicated to supporting
young and female entrepreneurs so as to boost employment and livelihoods
and also elevate the roles of youth and women in society, thereby
empowering them with greater access to decision-making.


● Enhance educational opportunities, particularly for girls - A
recent New York Times column noted, “The greatest threat to extremism isn’t
drones firing missiles, but girls reading books.”[23] Closing the education
gap in Northern Nigeria, particularly for girls, will improve the region’s
long-term development and also reduce the foothold of future extremist
groups like Boko Haram.


● Promote dialogue between agrarian and pastoralist communities -
Formalize regular and inclusive dialogue among contiguous communities in
order to build mutual understanding and facilitate early detection and
prevention or resolution of conflicts. Create new or strengthen existing
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to handle conflicts as they
emerge and before they devolve into violence. Such intercommunal dialogue
at the LGA and state levels could identify areas of common interest and
opportunities for potential mutual economic benefit.


Despite these challenges, the country of Nigeria has, in the past, proven
its resilience. By using its public resources wisely and improving
governance at the local, state and federal levels, the leaders of Africa’s
largest economy and most populous country can still deliver on the promises
of democracy and the dividends that many Nigerians expect of their
government, especially in the northern regions of the country. More
inclusive and responsive governance, especially at the local level, would
help sustain for the long term the military gains against Boko Haram and
ongoing efforts to tackle terrorism and skirmishes that impact negatively
on citizens’ wellbeing and undermine national cohesion.


Since the peaceful and credible elections of state and national leaders in
Nigeria in March 2015, the international community has more forcefully
expressed its appreciation of Nigerian efforts to tackle forthrightly
corruption, insecurity and economic development. The international
community should redouble its support through greater and more robust
partnerships with Nigerians at the sub-national levels, directly in the
northern states and Local Government Areas most impacted by
terrorist-related and/or intercommunal violence. Direct assistance to
locally-based institutions and social, citizen-led initiatives would likely
have greater impact and prospect to be sustainable over the long term. In
addition to security and other forms of material assistance, the
international community should prioritize human development expertise that
can address the trauma that the violence of the last few years has
inflicted on youth, women, girls and other underprivileged segments of
society.


Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee.

------------------------------

[1] Council on Foreign Relations, *Nigeria Security Tracker*.

[2] UNHCR, *Operation Sahel: Nigeria Situation*.

[3] USAID, *Lake Chad Basin - Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #7, FY2016,* April
27, 2016.

[4] Human Rights Watch, *They Set the Classrooms on Fire*, April 11, 2016.

[5] Council on Foreign Relations, *Nigeria Security Tracker*.

[6] Ibid*.*

[7] Mercy Corps International, *The Economic Costs of Conflict and the
Benefits of Peace: Effects of Farmer-Pastoralist Conflict in Nigeria’s
Middle Belt on State, Sector, and National Economies*, July 2015.

[8] For example, recent attacks in Benue state in February resulted in the
decimation of entire villages across 13 local government areas (LGAs) and
displaced as many as 20,000 people. Of Nigeria’s estimated 2.2 million
internally displaced persons (IDPs), about 12.5 percent (269,000 people)
are believed to be uprooted as a result of intercommunal clashes (Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Nigeria IDP Figures Analysis*, December
31, 2015).

[9] National Bureau of Statistics, *Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010*, January
2012.

[10] Kate Meagher, “Beyond terror: addressing the Boko Haram challenge in
Nigeria,” *Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center*, November 2014.

[11] Reuters, “Nigeria can handle Boko Haram, part of 'raw democracy', says
minister,” April 28, 2014.

[12] Morgan Winsor, “*Nigeria Shuts Down Cattle Markets Allegedly Financing
Boko Haram*,” International Business Times, March 14, 2016; see also
Business Day, “*Boko Haram cattle rustling prompts market shut-down in
Nigeria*,” March 6, 2016.

[13] Helene Cooper, “Boko Haram and ISIS Are Collaborating More, U.S.
Military Says,” *New York Times*, April 20, 2016.

[14] Mercy Corps, *Motivations and Empty Promises: Voices of Former Boko
Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth*, April 2016.

[15] Human Rights Watch, *They Set the Classrooms On Fire, *April 11, 2016.

[16] Mohamed M. Wader, Tanko Yusuf Dahiru and Mukhtar Imam, “The Myth and
Reality of Women’s Political Marginalization In Nigeria,” *International
Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention*, December 2015.

[17] International Growth Center, “Investing in Nigeria’s Youth
Bulge,” October 22, 2014.

[18] Human Rights Watch, *They Set the Classrooms on Fire,* April 11, 2016.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Mercy Corps, *Motivations and Empty Promises: Voices of Former Boko
Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth*, April 2016.

[21] Premium Times, “Buhari Breaks Silence, Orders ‘Herdsmen” Brought to
Justice,” April 27, 2016.

[22] Refugees International, *Nigeria**’**s Displaced Women and Girls:
Humanitarian Community at Odds, Boko Haram Survivors Forsaken, *April 21,
2016.

[23] Nicholas Kristof, “What’s So Scary About Smart Girls?,” *New York
Times*, May 10, 2014.


************************************


*Statement by Christopher Fomunyoh, Ph.D.*

*Senior Associate and Regional Director for Central and West Africa*

*National Democratic Institute*


*U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations*

*“Terrorism and Instability in sub-Saharan Africa: A Good Governance
Imperative”*

*May 10, 2016*


Mr. Chairman, ranking member Cardin, and distinguished members of the
Committee, on behalf of the National Democratic Institute (NDI), I
appreciate the opportunity to discuss terrorism and instability and make
the case for why democracy and good governance should be a central
component of any counterterrorism and stabilization strategy in Sub-Saharan
Africa. For more than 30 years, NDI has worked around the world to
establish and strengthen political and civic organizations, safeguard
elections, and promote citizen participation, openness, and accountability
in government. The Institute has conducted programs in, or worked with
participants from approximately 50 of Africa’s 54 countries; and I have
been fortunate to be part of our efforts in many of those countries for the
past two decades.


*Introduction*


Terrorist activity in sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade threatens to
destabilize the continent and roll back some of the gains in broadening
political space and participation since the global wave of democratization
that began in the 1990s. Groups such as Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria
and the Lake Chad basin, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI) in northern
Mali and the Sahel, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Horn of Africa have
caused tens of thousands of deaths and tremendous economic and social
dislocations of civilian populations. Some of these extremist organizations
operating in Africa are eager to establish alliances with violent extremist
organizations in other parts of the world, notably Al Qaeda and the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The international community is right in
supporting counterterrorism efforts that seek to defeat these extremist
groups militarily and must, at the same time, assist the affected countries
to address the root causes and triggers of the rise in extremism and
violence on the continent.


The principal motivation of today's terrorists in sub-Saharan Africa is
deeply rooted in a pattern of religious beliefs; however, it is noteworthy
that governance failures have exacerbated the impact of this phenomenon and
created an enabling environment in which extremism thrives. When a state
collapses, as was the case with Somalia prior to the emergence of
Al-Shabaab, or allows for huge swaths of ungovernable spaces, as was the
case in Northern Mali, or fails to fulfill its basic purpose of providing
citizens with access to a meaningful life, liberty, and property, as in
northeastern Nigeria, the social contract between the state and the
citizenry is broken. Discontent with governments that are viewed as
illegitimate or ineffective is a fertile ground for recruitment as
disaffected individuals may easily embrace extremism hoping to access a
better life, political power or voice and the resources linked to these
attributes in transition environments. Moreover, oppressed citizens and
marginalized groups that are denied access to basic public goods and
services and opportunities are more vulnerable to extremist appeals and
indoctrination by non-state actors who in return promise to fulfill their
needs. Efforts to counter violent extremism and terrorism in sub-Saharan
Africa must, therefore, address poor governance as part of the overall
strategy. Based on institutional lessons learned through NDI’s work, my own
experience and expertise as an African, and what I hear loud and clear from
African democrats -- leaders and activists alike -- across the continent, I
would strongly offer the following three recommendations for your
consideration:

· Any counterterrorism strategy for Africa should be grounded in
the consolidation of democracy and good governance such that short term
military victories can be sustained in the medium to long term. We cannot
defeat violent extremism now only to take up the same fight five, 10 years
down the road.

· Autocratic regimes should not get a pass from the international
community solely because they are good partners in the fight against
terrorism. Shrinking political space, frequent and overt violations of
citizen rights and freedoms, and the undermining of constitutional rule and
meaningful elections breed discontent and disaffection that form the
fertile ground for recruiters and perpetrators of violence and extremism.
Good partners in countering violent extremism and terrorism can and should
be good performers in democratic governance. These two principles are not
mutually exclusive; in fact they are mutually reinforcing.

· Africans of this generation are jittery and extremely fearful of
reliving the experience of the Cold War era during which dictatorships
thrived amidst grave human deprivation and gross human rights abuses just
because some leaders were allies of the West at the time. The fight against
terrorism should not become a substitute for the Cold War paradigm of this
century with regards to sub-Saharan Africa.


*Governance Gaps and Extremism*


According to a 2009 report by the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), marginalized citizens who feel excluded from the political process
may turn to extremist groups to fight for inclusion or to gain a sense of
belonging.[1] Also, a 2014 study by academics at the University of
Illinois, Chicago, and Pennsylvania State University found that countries
where ethnic groups are excluded from political power suffer from more
domestic terror attacks.[2] Unfortunately, in many African countries the
politics of exclusion remains a reality. Identity politics, buttressed by
subjective criteria such as ethnicity, region of origin, and in a few cases
religion, breeds discontent and dissatisfaction within communities.


Poor governance accounts for low and uneven rates of economic and human
development, poor service delivery, and lack of opportunities for gainful
employment and/or prosperity and societies with these traits tend to be
breeding grounds in which extremist groups thrive.[3] Dissatisfaction with
a government’s failures to ensure a reasonable quality of life can lead to
radicalization and a rejection of central authority.


Democratic governance is critical to every counterterrorism strategy --
before, so citizen grievances are not allowed to fester and breed
extremism, dissatisfaction, and alienation from the state; during, to
deprive extremists of possible recruitment grounds; and after, to sustain
the peace that would have been gained militarily for the medium to long
term. Excessive deprivation in both economic terms and in access to
political voice, freedom, and civil liberties makes young people vulnerable
to the recruitment incentives of extremist movements.


*Particularities of the Terrorist Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa*


According to the Institute for Economics and Peace’s Global Terrorism Index
(2015), sub-Saharan Africa experienced the second highest number of
terrorism-related casualties in 2014, with more than 10,000 deaths.[4] The
greatest terrorist impacts were in northern Nigeria and neighboring
countries in the Lake Chad basin, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa.


*Boko Haram in Nigeria*


According to the Index report, Boko Haram is the deadliest terrorist group
in the world (ahead of ISIS, the Taliban, and Al-Shabaab), having killed
more than 7,000 people in terrorist attacks in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and
Niger in 2014 alone.[5] On a global scale, in 2014 northern Nigeria
suffered 23 percent of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide.[6] In
recent months, as Boko Haram has been militarily degraded, it has changed
tactics by dramatically increasing cross-border attacks by suicide bombers
in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. Boko Haram was formed by a Muslim leader,
Mohammed Yusuf, who railed against government corruption and failure to
adhere to the ideology of an Islamic state as a battle cry to recruit young
followers, many of whom saw themselves as marginalized and victimized by
the Nigerian government.[7] Its first public manifestation was in the
attack of a police station in Borno State in 2009.


*Al-Shabaab in Somalia*


In the Horn of Africa, Somalia faces an Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic
terrorist group, Al-Shabaab, which seeks to undermine any semblance of
authority by the Somali government. Al-Shabaab emerged in 1991 after the
collapse of the Somali state and protracted armed conflict among various
ethnically-based factions. The group took advantage of the power vacuum and
prevailing anarchy generated by the intra-Somali conflict to build camps
and train fighters without fear of state interference. At its peak,
Al-Shabaab recruited young marginalized Somalis by providing basic services
to citizens in regions under its control.[8] Despite suffering major
setbacks and being pushed out of major cities, Al-Shabaab killed more
people in terrorist attacks in 2014 than ever before -- more than 800
people were killed in close to 500 attacks, approximately double the number
killed the previous year.[9] Al-Shabaab continues to seek openings to
commit terrorist acts outside of Somalia, as it has done in the past
killing civilians in attacks in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.


*Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine, and Al Mourabitoun in
Northern Mali*


Despite the military defeat of Islamist militants by African and French
troops (Operation Serval) in 2013, and the signing of a peace accord in
Bamako in June 2015, northern Mali remains vulnerable to terrorist
activity. Recent attacks on western hotels in Bamako and neighboring
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, underscore the new strategy of Ansar Dine and Al
Mourabitoun, which now focus on attacking “soft targets” such as hotels,
cafes, and supermarkets. Terrorists first gained strength in the region
between 2010 and 2012 when extremists and criminal networks previously
active in Algeria in the 1990s moved into ungoverned spaces in northern
Mali and later capitalized on a separatist movement sparked by
dissatisfaction with the performance of the central government in Bamako
and allegations of extreme corruption and ineffectiveness in public service
delivery.


*Timeliness of Counterterrorism Partnerships*


As African countries have faced these new security threats for which their
militaries were ill-prepared, a variety of partnerships have emerged to
assist national and sub-regional forces, with the United States playing a
lead role. African countries have provided ground troops to fight
terrorism in the Horn of Africa, Northern Nigeria and Northern Mali,[10] and
have relied on European nations and the United States for more
sophisticated equipment and specialized training. The net result has been
the degradation of the bulk of jihadist movements that now have only
limited capacity to launch small scale, albeit deadly, attacks using in
some cases, suicide bombers.


Unfortunately, in some cases, African governments that are counterterrorism
partners are not the best performers on democracy and good governance,
which is also one of the declared pillars of U.S. policy in Africa. In
fact, a number of these countries are ranked as “not free” by Freedom House.
[11] There is a growing perception, and many Africans are fearful that
democracy and governance could be sidelined in pursuit of security, and
that counterterrorism has become a pretext for undermining democratic
values and practices. Africans that lived through the Cold War are
beginning to see parallels today as governments that partner with the West
to combat violent extremism may feel entitled to unconditional support
regardless of their poor performance in other areas. A number of country
examples illustrate the point.


● *Shrinking political space in some counter-terrorism partner
countries - *In a number of countries some of the gains in civil and human
rights of the 1990s are being eroded as political parties and civil society
groups are denied political space for citizen engagement and participation
or for their voices to be heard. In one notable example, while Chad has
played an important role in fighting terrorism in the Lake Chad basin and
in northern Mali, its poor track record on democratic governance, including
recent allegations of extrajudicial killings of soldiers who voted against
the president in the last election, should give the international community
pause.[12]


● *Newly enacted antiterrorism laws stifle dissent for political
purposes - *Ethiopia, for example, is a strong counterterrorism partner in
the Horn, but continues to repress political rights, restrict speech, and
arrest members of opposition parties.[13] During legislative elections in
2015, the ruling party won all 547 seats in the lower house. The government
uses broadly defined anti-terrorism laws to suppress critics, including
nine journalists who were arrested in 2014 and several more who have been
in detention since 2006. The Committee to Protect Journalists noted that
the 10 journalists detained at the end of 2015 risk being tried under
anti-terrorism laws.[14] Furthermore, the government has violently
suppressed peaceful protests in Oromia, home of Ethiopia’s largest ethnic
group, against a government development plan that would displace
farmers. Security forces have reportedly killed over 200 people and
arrested thousands, including prominent Oromo political leaders.[15]


● *Poor performance on constitutionalism and rule of law - *Burundi
is now mired in a post-election crisis in which over 400 people have been
killed and hundreds of thousands internally displaced or become refugees in
neighboring countries. To many Burundians and other international analysts,
the crisis emanates from the current government’s recalcitrance in seeking
another five year mandate despite the presidential term limitation of the
2005 Arusha accords. These Burundian democracy supporters believe that the
country’s poor track record on constitutionalism and human rights had been
overlooked by counterterrorism partners because of the regime’s troop
contributions to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).


● *Backsliding on elections and political rights - *Recently
identified as a “key strategic partner” for its support for AMISOM,[16] Uganda
has declined in its recent Freedom House ratings from “partly free” to “not
free” as a result of the government’s increased violations of civil rights.
[17] Unfair conditions leading up to this year’s national elections further
eroded public confidence in the government, led by one of the longest
serving African presidents.[18]


African democrats are increasingly fearful of a return to the Cold War
paradigm through which a government’s involvement in combating terrorism
overshadows the rights of citizens to a responsive and democratic state.
Recent public opinion surveys by Afrobarometer show that while a very high
percentage of Africans aspire to democracy – 70 percent of Africans
preferring democracy to other forms of government -- fewer than half of
those in countries surveyed are satisfied with how democracy is working in
their country, a drop from previous years.[19]


*Recommendations*


*How, therefore, can counterterrorism assistance better incorporate
democracy building?*


● Counterterrorism partners should design strategies that also
integrate objectives to improve governance such as by encouraging more
effective decentralization and voice at the local level in impacted
communities and populations. Counterterrorism initiatives should take a
holistic (all of government approach) that incorporates governance
considerations from conceptualization through operationalization and
consolidation.


● Host governments should be encouraged to not only defeat the
negative forces militarily, but also to invest in rehabilitating
communities and creating governance structures to tackle and eliminate the
conditions that fostered the rise of support for extremism in order to
guard against a relapse.


● Partners should increase assistance to nascent democracies with
weak political institutions to develop functional, responsive governments
that are able to deliver basic services to their citizens. Consolidation
of democracy should be approached as a long-term process that requires
consistent and continued support with mechanisms to reward or incentivize
good behavior and penalize poor performance.


● Use public diplomacy and other mechanisms to state clearly and
unambiguously expectations for democratic behavior across Africa, as
development partners did so successfully in Nigeria in
2014/2015. Moreover, such statements, as recently done in the Democratic
Republic of Congo and Burundi, should be followed by concrete actions and
long-term commitments to sustain support for democracy and good governance.


● Invest in education to guarantee peace and opportunities for this
generation of youth. As argued eloquently in a recent New York Times op-ed
by renowned journalist Nicholas Kristof, education can be more effective in
combating militancy than military intervention.[20] Girls’ education in
particular can promote a virtuous cycle of development by increasing the
formal labor force, boosting the economy and reducing demographic growth.


*Conclusion*


Poor governance is a driver of discontent and resentment of the state that
can push citizens in transition environments to join or sympathize with
extremist networks. To be successful in combatting violent extremism and
preventing its reappearance or resurgence, counterterrorism efforts must
also address root causes.


Given the high demand for democracy and good governance across Africa, the
continent’s partners have a critical role to play in helping sub-Saharan
African countries address issues relating to terrorism in ways that are
consistent with democratic principles. The international community has many
tools at its disposal to continue to lead in this endeavor.


Despite the enthusiasm of a few years ago, and some remarkable
accomplishments in the last two decades, democratic governance in Africa is
under attack. On the one hand, it is challenged by external threats from
extremist terrorist organizations and; on the other hand, in some cases, by
internal threats from autocratic regimes that fail to deliver public
services, combat corruption and protect rights and freedoms. The
international community should do everything in its power to help rid the
continent of both existential threats. Friends of Africa must make sure
that they do not, willingly or inadvertently, allow themselves to become
accomplices in denying Africans their basic rights and freedoms and a
secure, prosperous future.


Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee.

------------------------------

[1] USAID. Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism.
<http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadt978.pdf> February 2009.

[2] Seung-Whan Choi and James A. Piazza. “Ethnic groups, political
exclusion and domestic terrorism
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.987579>,” Defense and Peace
Economics. December 11, 2014.

[3] USAID. Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism.
<http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadt978.pdf> February 2009.

[4]Institute for Economics and Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2015:
Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism
<http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf>
.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

[7] Brooking’s Institute. ‘The disease is unbelief’: Boko Haram’s religious
and political worldview
<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2016/01/boko-haram-ideology-thurston/brookings-analysis-paper_alex-thurston_final_web.pdf>.
January 2016

[8] Center for Strategic & International Studies. “Al Shabaab.” AQAM
Futures Project Case Study Series. July 2011

[9] Institute for Economics and Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2015:
Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism.

[10] French troops and a smaller contingent of other European forces
(German and Dutch) are engaged as part of current UN operations in northern
Mali.

[11] Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2015
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.VyxBKjArI2w>
.

[12] Convention Tchadienne Pour la Défense des Droits Humains. “Communiqué
de Presse N°012/2016.
<http://tchadpages.com/tchad-la-ctddh-preoccupee-par-les-disparitions-les-executions-sommaires-et-les-arrestations-massives-de-militaires-apres-lelection-presidentielle/>
”

[13] Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2016.
<https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FITW_Report_2016.pdf>

[14] Committee to Protect Journalists. 2015 Prison Census.
<https://cpj.org/imprisoned/2015.php>

[15] Human Rights Watch. Ethiopia: No Let Up in Crackdown on Protests
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/21/ethiopia-no-let-crackdown-protests>.
February 21, 2016.

[16] U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs. “U.S. Relations
with Uganda. Fact Sheet <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2963.htm>.” October
2, 2015.

[17] Freedom House. Freedom in the World 2015
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.VyxBKjArI2w>
.

[18] State Department Press Statement. “On the Results of Uganda’s
Presidential Elections <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/253096.htm>.”
February 20, 2016.

[19] Afrobarometer. “African democracy update: Satisfaction remains elusive
for many
<http://afrobarometer.org/blogs/african-democracy-update-satisfaction-remains-elusive-many>”
September 16, 2015.

[20] Nicholas Kristof. “What’s So Scary about Smart Girls?
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/opinion/sunday/kristof-whats-so-scary-about-smart-girls.html?mwrsm=Email&_r=0>”
New York Times, May 10, 2016