EMAIL DETAILS
SUBJECT:
Re: New Yorker: Age of Political Risk
PRI: NORMAL
FROM:
M
mandrews@ips.edu
DATE:
2010-07-27 15:31:36
MSG_ID:
<65CDE381-222E-485C-BA17-06F72D56855A@ips.edu>
RECIPIENTS:
TO:
E
Eric Schwerin
<eschwerin@rosemontseneca.com>
CC:
C
Chris Heinz
<cheinz@rosemontseneca.com>
D
Devon Archer
<darcher@rosemontseneca.com>
H
Hunter Biden
<hbiden@rosemontseneca.com>
N
Neil Callahan
<ncallahan@rosemontseneca.com>
CONTENT:
TEXT: YES |
HTML: YES
PROCESSED
Eric, Thanks. This is a very good article and as you know we did run a short program tracking the top rungs of the German elite ( mostly political). I think the message of political risk can be applied to any country but of course some countries or regions are more important. I will pass this on to some of the people we saw in Australia concerned about the expanding nature of political risk. Michael On Jul 27, 2010, at 6:58 AM, Eric Schwerin wrote: > Saw this column in the New Yorker from a couple of months ago and it > seems to give a perfect explanation as to why there is a need for a > Vide like product. Not sure if anyone else saw it but wanted to > share. Worth reading. > > THE AGE OF POLITICAL RISK > by James Surowiecki > MAY 24, 2010 > TEXT SIZE: > SMALL TEXT > MEDIUM TEXT > LARGE TEXT > PRINT E-MAIL FEEDS > > KEYWORDS > Political Risk; Greece; Germany; European Union (E.U.); (Prime > Minister) Angela Merkel; Bailouts; International Monetary Fund > (I.M.F.) > t seems crazy: the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia holds an > election, and Americans’ 401(k)s go haywire. But that’s not a bad > shorthand description of what’s happened to the stock market over > the past few weeks. What links the two is the Greek debt crisis and > the actions of Germany’s Prime Minister, Angela Merkel, the villain > of the story. When the scale of Greece’s problems first became > clear, she grudgingly agreed to help with a bailout. But in the > spring Germans started to ask why they should pay for Greek > fecklessness and, as elections loomed, Merkel began taking a harder > line in her public comments. The tougher she talked, the more > skittish markets got. On April 26th, Merkel gave a speech in which > she said, “Germany will help if the appropriate conditions are > met,” making it sound as if that help were far from a sure thing. > The yield on Greek debt immediately soared, and within days a rout > was on. It may well have been the most expensive “if” in history. > The European Union did eventually come through with a rescue package > for Greece and other beleaguered members, like Portugal, but the > markets didn’t calm down, rallying on Monday only to nosedive again > at the end of the week. The fact is, this kind of volatility isn’t > going away, because we now live in an environment dominated by what > economists call “political risk”—the uncertainty that > businesses face as a result of government actions. Of course, > government actions always affect the economy, but usually in an > undramatic way: an interest-rate cut here, a new regulation there. > The economic downturn and the debt crisis have given us instead a > world where governments are among the most important players in > markets—injecting money into economies on a colossal scale and > routinely propping up, or even nationalizing, troubled companies. > As a result, investors have a vast range of new things to worry > about, like voter sentiment in Westphalia. They have to try to > figure out whether policymakers will do things they shouldn’t, like > slash spending during a downturn, and not do what they should, which > is to intervene promptly when systemic crises appear. Unfortunately, > this sort of thing is inherently harder to predict than, say, how > Procter & Gamble is going to do over the next few years. Last week, > Mohamed El-Erian, the C.E.O. of the bond giant Pimco, sent a letter > to investors saying that “the new normal” is a world in which > “the public sector plays a much more influential role.” That’s > a more uncertain world and therefore one in which markets will be > more volatile. > Political risk is hard to manage because so much comes down to the > personal choices of policymakers, whether prime ministers or heads > of central banks. And those choices aren’t always going to be > economically rational—witness Merkel’s recent tergiversations. > Similarly, the U.S. government’s failure to bail out Lehman > Brothers in 2008 seems to have been in part the result of Treasury > Secretary Henry Paulson’s desire not to be seen as Mr. Bailout. > Investors, then, are being forced to read the minds of policymakers— > not something they’re good at. Markets work best when there’s > lots of information available and a historical track record to go > on; they excel at predicting things like horse races, election > outcomes, and box-office results. But they’re bad at predicting > things like who will be the next Supreme Court nominee, as that > depends on the whim of the President. > > FROM THE ISSUECARTOON BANKE-MAIL THIS > Also injecting uncertainty is the fact that, even when politicians > do the right thing, timing is all. Take theTARP bailout plan. > Congress rejected it the first time around, in the fall of 2008, and > the Dow fell nearly eight hundred points in a day. TARP passed on a > second attempt, but by then the damage was done: fear and risk > aversion had spread, and the stock market tumbled fifteen per cent > more in a week. The bill for the Greek bailout has ballooned as a > result of similar delay. In March, people were talking about a > commitment of twenty-two billion euros. By early May, the E.U. and > the I.M.F. planned to come up with a hundred and ten billion euros. > Now more countries need bailouts and the total cost is seven hundred > and fifty billion. The initial estimates were certainly too low, > but, had Merkel acted sooner, the bill could have been a lot cheaper. > Politicians do sometimes do the right thing at the right time, but > that’s no easier to foresee. In 1995, with Mexico teetering on the > edge of default and threatening to take down much of Latin America > with it, the Clinton Administration conjured up a back-door twenty- > billion-dollar loan bailout that stabilized the Mexican economy. In > 1998, when Hong Kong came under attack from speculators who believed > that its currency and stock market were overvalued, the government > daringly put enough money into the stock market to send the hedge > funds packing. And, just last year, the Obama Administration’s > decision to stress-test the country’s biggest banks and require > them to raise capital from private investors, rather than simply > nationalize them, was instrumental in stabilizing a falling market. > But in each case it was far from clear that the action would really > happen—all three decisions were subject to vituperative criticism— > so unpredictability still reigned. > Political risk adds new complexity to markets, and, as Nassim Taleb, > the author of “The Black Swan,” recently said to me, “As the > system gets more complex, it becomes harder to forecast.” Claire > Hill, a law professor at the University of Minnesota, argues that > investors trying to manage political risk have historically moved > between extremes of “optimism and skittishness,” which sounds a > lot like the current situation. That doesn’t mean you should put > your money in gold; over time, even volatile markets can rise. But > it won’t be a smooth ride. ♦ > > > Eric D. Schwerin > eschwerin@rosemontseneca.com > > Sent from my iPhone
METADATA:
THREAD:
INDEX:
Adhhp//mIFsyTixKR1qJQ7a39lRH0Q==
REFERENCES:
REPLY_TO:
<6F21FD27-4AB7-4999-B320-CD819CB0D550@rosemontseneca.com>
REFS:
<6F21FD27-4AB7-4999-B320-CD819CB0D550@rosemontseneca.com>