EMAIL DETAILS

I thought Board members -- along with members of the Chairman's Council and
Ambassador's Circle -- particularly those who traveled to Tbilisi last
year, would be interested in receiving the following NDI statement on
Georgia in advance of the presidential election there. The delegation,
which included Board member Rick Inderfurth and former Governor Christie
Todd Whitman, prepared a thoughtful and insightful assessment of the
country's political environment.

With best regards,

Ken


Kenneth Wollack
President
National Democratic Institute
455 Massachusetts Ave., NW, 8th Floor
Washington, DC 20001
202-728-5500 (Tel)
888-875-2887 (Fax)
email: ken@ndi.org
website: www.ndi.org


*STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE*

*PRE-ELECTION DELEGATION TO GEORGIA*


*Tbilisi, Georgia, July 27, 2018*


This statement is offered by an international delegation organized by the
National Democratic Institute (NDI). The delegation’s purpose was to
accurately and impartially assess electoral preparations in advance of the
October presidential election; review the broader political environment;
examine factors that could affect the integrity of the electoral process;
and offer recommendations that could help advance dialogue and
consensus-building toward credible elections and public confidence in the
process. The Institute has undertaken its mission in accordance with
the *Declaration
of Principles for International Election Observation* and its
accompanying *Code
of Conduct for International Election Observers,* which have been endorsed
by 55 leading international election observation organizations. In
September, NDI will deploy a team of long-term analysts. This will be
supplemented by an international observation delegation on election day.


Members of the delegation include Per Eklund, former EU ambassador to
Georgia; Karl Inderfurth, former U.S. assistant secretary of state and NDI
board member; Christine Todd Whitman, former governor of New Jersey; Marija
Babic, independent electoral expert; Laura Thornton, NDI global associate
and senior director in Georgia; and Melissa Muscio, NDI program director
for Georgia, Turkey, and Central Asia.


The delegation would like to stress that it does not seek to interfere in
Georgia’s election process and recognizes that, ultimately, it will be the
people of Georgia who will determine the credibility of their elections and
the country’s democratic development. The delegation therefore offers this
pre-election statement in the spirit of supporting and strengthening
democratic institutions and processes in Georgia.


*CONTEXT*


Georgia enters the election with numerous democratic assets. Fundamental
freedoms of expression, assembly, and association are largely respected.
Civil society organizations (CSOs) play an active role in political life.
For the most part, Georgian media provides space to diverse viewpoints and
television remains the primary source of information for Georgian citizens.
Voters have a variety of political choices, and citizens largely trust the
electoral process. According to NDI public opinion research, they deemed
last year’s local elections and the 2016 parliamentary elections as safe,
orderly, and without intimidation. International election observers
assessed them as credible, efficiently administered, and transparent.

Georgia heads into this presidential election with uncertainty. The date
still has not been set; the ruling party has not yet determined whether it
will field a candidate; the current president has not decided whether or
not he will run; parties are divided about the relevance of this election
given the limitations of the office, sending a message of ambivalence to
the public. Even with reduced responsibilities, the president has the
public mandate to represent citizens and shape national discussions.
Further, he or she has the potential to serve as an additional check on
government and represents the country in foreign policy.

The presidential election campaign should not be viewed in isolation and
will take place in an environment shaped by recent legal and political
changes. The amended constitution of 2017 introduced numerous changes to
the electoral and political environment, including controversial reforms,
such as terminating the direct election of president after the 2018
presidential election and postponing fully proportional elections to 2024,
restricting foreign land ownership, and defining marriage as a union only
between a man and a woman. These changes remain front and center in the
public discourse today. In May, a series of widespread street protests
shook Tbilisi, including protests against the handling of drug-related
arrests in city nightclubs, anti-LGBTI and self-declared fascist marches,
and rallies following allegations of police mishandling evidence and
cover-ups in the murder of two teenagers in December 2017. The latter case
struck a nerve in Georgian society, feeding perceptions of lack of justice
and unequal application of the law in cases involving those with political
connections. Protestors called for the immediate resignation of the
prosecutor general, which subsequently took place, and of the justice
minister, who is still in her position. In a welcome move, a parliamentary
investigative commission headed by the opposition was established to
examine the case.

On the political front, the former prime minister, Bidzina Ivanishvili,
officially re-assumed the position of head of the ruling party Georgian
Dream (GD), pledging to resolve disagreements within the party, among other
reasons. Shortly after, there was the sudden and surprising departure of
Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili, reportedly due to disagreements with
the party chair and concerns about economic policy. In June, the cabinet
was reshuffled and Mamuka Bakhtadze, former finance minister, became prime
minister. Despite these political shake-ups, citizens remain disengaged.
According to NDI polls, for several years, most citizens do not support any
of their political options, with at least half of citizens consistently
describing themselves as undecided. This is particularly true among the
country’s youth. Polls also show Georgians have minimal engagement with
elected leaders and evaluate their representatives’ performance poorly.

In 2017, a NDI delegation reported observing the emergence of two parallel
views of Georgia -- one seen through the lens of ruling GD party leaders
and officials and one described by other parties, civil society
organizations, and some observers. This observation remains valid today.
Government representatives described their reform agenda and successful
progress toward the establishment of a European parliamentary democracy.
Those outside the ruling party pointed to opaque and unexplained
decision-making, concentrated in the party chair, whether it is the
dismissal and appointment of the government, selection of party leaders and
candidates, or control over key bodies such as the state security services.
Opposition parties and civic leaders also described the elimination of the
direct election of the president as a step backwards for democracy,
particularly in a country with a history of a dominant party, and
repeatedly lamented the lack of checks and balances and separation of
powers in Georgia. They also point to a reduction in balanced,
comprehensive political coverage in Georgia. Rustavi 2, one of the two main
broadcasters, continues to face legal and financial barriers and other
media outlets, especially regional media, report a lack of financial
resources. Changes in policies and programming at the Georgian Public
Broadcaster also reduced political discussion.[1]
<#m_7698277296354444700__ftn1> These divergent views on the country’s
democratic course affect the way in which the election process and its
challenges are assessed.


Although not yet seen as a critical issue in these elections, both
opposition and ruling parties agree that Georgia is subject to a steady
flow of disinformation and the increase of intolerant movements and
messages. Once campaigning gets underway and election day nears,
disinformation and anti-democratic efforts could intensify. According to
groups monitoring disinformation, the prevailing messages in Georgia focus
on European Union (EU) and NATO membership as a threat to Georgian culture,
religion, and national identity, as well as Russian aggression and loss of
territories. Non-governmental organizations and political parties ascribed
the origins of most of these messages to Russia, saying they are intended
to undermine confidence in democratic values and norms. Some concerns were
raised about the messages of such efforts, particularly xenophobic and
anti-LGBTI narratives, infiltrating into the campaign rhetoric of parties
and candidates. Civil society disinformation experts pointed to the fact
that this had already occurred, as the constitutional amendments included
both a foreign land ownership ban and marriage-rights amendment.


*LEGAL FRAMEWORK*


The elections must be held on a Sunday during the month of October. The
president of Georgia, with the prime minister’s counter signature, fixes
the date of elections no later than 60 days in advance. Elections are
conducted by a three-level election administration comprising the Central
Election Commission (CEC), 73 district election commissions (DECs) and some
3,600 precinct election commissions (PECs). Commissions at each level
consists of 12 members, with six representing political parties and others
appointed by the parliament or upper level commissions as so called
professional members. The CEC chairperson is nominated by the president and
elected by the CEC with a two-thirds majority for a five-year term. The
mandate of the current CEC chairperson expires after the election process
is concluded and she can be re-appointed.


A reduction in powers of the president started in 2013 as part of Georgia’s
transition from a presidential to a parliamentary system, though, as
mentioned above, many lament the impact on already weak checks and balances
in the country. Changes to the constitution, enacted in 2017, eliminated
the direct election of the president starting in 2024, taking away a key
source of presidential power -- the popular mandate -- and further reduced
some responsibilities of an already weakened presidential office. The
ruling party claims to have maintained direct elections for 2018 as a
“consolation prize” of sorts for the incumbent president. The president
will retain the responsibility of representing Georgia abroad; will have a
role to play in some judicial appointments to the High Council of Justice
and Constitutional Court, but no longer the Supreme Court; can exercise
veto power, although parliament can easily override it; and, most
importantly, has the public platform to advocate on behalf of citizen
interests. The National Security Council has been abolished, only to be
reestablished when or if it is rehoused in another office, a gap viewed as
dangerous by domestic and international security experts.


*CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT*


Several CSOs, GD and other government leaders, as well as some opposition
parties were hard pressed to articulate the importance of this election and
appeared to view it as a relatively futile exercise. The uncertainty of the
election date is leading to concerns about a compressed campaign period and
is causing frustration among opposition parties and media representatives
as they attempt to plan. Characterizing the election as “strange,” GD
leaders noted the difficulty of campaigning on issues that the public cares
about, given the lack of policy-making powers of the office. As such, they
raised concerns that campaigns would instead devolve into personal attacks,
or even a referendum on the government. GD has not selected a candidate yet
and leaders have indicated that they may not, perhaps to avoid this
potential protest vote and a possible second round. Alternatively, they may
back an independent candidate, citing their awareness of concerns of one
party dominance. The current president also has not made a decision on
whether to run. The lack of information about the current president’s
candidacy and GD’s selection further contributes to the perception of the
election’s unimportance.


By contrast, the two major opposition parties, United National Movement
(UNM), in a coalition with 10 smaller parties called Strength is in Unity,
and European Georgia (EG) appeared determined to capitalize on the
opportunity to use the race as a platform to challenge the ruling party and
raise their profile and influence ahead of 2020 parliamentary elections.
UNM has nominated former Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigol Vashadze, while
EG has nominated party head and minority leader David Bakradze. They view
the race as an opportunity to test their apparatus and messages. Both
parties argue that the office is significant and provides opportunities to
check the government and hold leaders to account. Each had already
identified relevant campaign issues that fall under the purview of the
president, including judicial appointments and the benefits that the
president could bring to the country through strategic strengthening of
foreign relations. Importantly, opposition parties emphasized the moral
authority of having a popular mandate and asserted that the president can
draw important visibility to the people’s needs. Both thought it possible
to tie the functions of the president to daily issues people care about,
particularly the economy. EG will be faced with the additional task of
differentiating itself from UNM. Though the two parties claim they have
grown further apart in terms of policy, citizens remain unclear about who
is which party, according to EG leaders. Other parties and candidates who
have declared their intention to run include Zurab Japaridze from Girchi
and Shalva Natelashvili from the Georgian Labor Party.


Although citizens strongly support the direct election of president,[2]
<#m_7698277296354444700__ftn2> they appear to be relatively disengaged
about the upcoming presidential poll. In recent NDI focus groups,
participants appeared to understand well the limited responsibilities of
the office and many articulated a desire to see the president’s powers
increase. Under the current system, however, they expressed the belief that
it “doesn’t make a difference” who is president. This lack of interest,
combined with undecided citizens, and potential decisions not to compete by
GD and the incumbent president, could have an adverse effect on voter
turnout. Political parties acknowledged that they must inspire the public
with compelling arguments about why this election and office remain
relevant to encourage voters. The CEC is conducting talks with voters
around the country to explain the process and significance of this
election, the media intends to hold debates and discussions to explore
campaigns and their issues, and the prime minister referenced plans to
bolster political participation in the voting process.


*ELECTORAL INTEGRITY CHALLENGES*


*Systemic Challenges*


Georgia’s legislative framework is broadly in line with international
standards and conducive to the conduct of democratic elections. However, a
number of longstanding issues that pre-date the current government remain
unresolved despite having the authority to do so. These challenges appear
to be more entrenched in the electoral culture and require political will
-- rather than mere legislative fixes -- to be addressed. They can be
grouped into two main and intertwined areas: disparity of resources and
intimidation. The resource challenge involves uneven campaign donations and
alleged abuse of state resources, both advantaging the ruling party.
Alleged intimidation by various state agencies from school administrations
to the state security services and unresolved acts of violence, albeit
rare, send a message of impunity and introduce an element of fear in the
environment. While some believe that these acts are part of an organized
intimidation effort, others maintain that these are merely actions of
individuals misguidedly seeking to please their superiors. These problems
are not new and have passed from one ruling party to the next.


There is no consensus on these problems. The opposition asserts that the
disparities in the financial playing field makes the election effectively
uncompetitive. The State Audit Office (SAO) reported that in 2017 GD
received 90 percent of campaign funding.[3] <#m_7698277296354444700__ftn3>
Opposition parties described donors’ expressed hesitancy to contribute to
them given the advantage of incumbency and benefits of contributing to the
ruling party.[4] <#m_7698277296354444700__ftn4> Further creating imbalance,
opposition parties and observer groups described to the delegation the
state use of human resources, such as pressuring civil servants and their
families to vote for the government party as well as physical and financial
resources, such as the use of public buildings, vehicles, and equipment for
campaign purposes. They acknowledged that such cases were difficult to
monitor and few of their complaints to relevant bodies were submitted and
resolved.


The ruling party representatives, however, denied to the delegation that
there has been a large discrepancy in funds available to the parties,
explaining that the SAO reports are not accurate because they do not
capture the unreported funding of opposition parties. GD leaders asserted
that opposition parties received substantial undeclared funding, including
from abroad, and that this was evident in their visible spending on
activists and materials. The SAO took, in their view, a more “passive”
approach to avoid “repressive methods” in tracking opposition party
funding. The ruling party also argued that abuse of state resources rarely
occurs, pointing to the small number of case rulings.


The perception of intimidation is also conflicting. Opposition leaders
described the various levels of intimidation related to elections,
including harassment of their activists by local officials, pressure on
state employees to campaign and/or vote for the ruling party or risk losing
their jobs, and intimidation of voters outside polling stations. They
repeatedly singled out the state security services as responsible for
intimidation, leading voters to doubt the secrecy of their vote. CSOs and
opposition parties acknowledge that electoral acts of violence have become
a rarity, but they point out that the lack of resolution of previously
documented cases creates an atmosphere of impunity and can engender an
environment of fear for citizens. The perpetrators who committed violence
against opposition leaders in Khortskeli in 2016, for example, have still
not been brought to justice despite acknowledgment of their activists’
wrongdoing by GD leaders, ample video evidence, and witness reports.
Intimidation
is difficult to verify, with few willing to testify, so observer groups are
unable to track the existence and breadth of the problem. The ruling party
leaders, however, deny that such intimidation is a continuing problem,
claiming they have already taken “concrete measures” to avoid these types
of incidents.


As such, there is no agreement between the ruling party and opposition
parties and CSOs on the two most reported and serious concerns -- resources
and intimidation. Political will of the government is necessary to resolve
these key challenges. Even if the government is skeptical of their
validity, leaders have a responsibility to address these concerns to build
public confidence in the political process and increase trust in their
leadership.


*Procedural and Legal Issues*


In addition to the challenges above, a number of problems exist that could
be addressed through legal and procedural fixes. In June 2018, prominent
Georgian observer organizations published comprehensive recommendations on
improvements to the electoral code.[5] <#m_7698277296354444700__ftn5> These
and other relevant recommendations are yet to be discussed or adopted by
relevant authorities and implemented in an adequate manner.


One key concern outlined in the CSO report is the composition of the
election administration. Legal amendments introduced last year have
significantly narrowed the number of parties eligible for election
commission seats and tilted the composition in favor of the majority party.
[6] <#m_7698277296354444700__ftn6> This has sparked protest among
opposition and observers, especially in light of concerns that the
so-called professional election commission members are affiliated with GD
and are unable to exercise the impartiality required of the position.


Another problem is shortcomings in the procedures regarding the correction
of protocols, reconciliation of ballots, and recount provisions. The
election code allows PECs to correct results protocols based simply by
writing an explanatory note rather than recounting the ballots or examining
other relevant material evidence. The legal framework does not require
consistency between the number of ballots cast and results, nor does it
specify exact grounds for a recount. As such, when there is no
reconciliation of the vote, requests for recounts have been dismissed.[7]
<#m_7698277296354444700__ftn7>


CSOs and parties remain concerned about the electoral authorities’ narrow
interpretation of laws related to the abuse of administrative resources and
unlawful campaigning. Further, they have recommended clarity on rules
regarding canvassing and social media in campaigns. Additionally, they have
expressed frustration with the existing mechanisms for resolution of
complaints and grievances. In their view, election officials have
frequently dismissed their concerns on purely formalistic grounds, avoiding
sufficient review of the merits of each case.


*CEC*


The Commission reported ongoing activities aimed at addressing issues
raised during previous elections. The CEC is working on increasing election
officials’ knowledge of the election procedures and the recent amendments.
It is training DEC members on complaints resolution mechanism and is
preparing to employ a new training methodology for PEC members to improve
the counting process and reduce the number of errors in the results
protocols. As part of its efforts to enhance citizens’ awareness of the
election processes, the CEC is holding various trainings, university
courses, lectures or field visits, and providing grants to CSOs to train
political party representatives on election procedures or work on voter
education and outreach. The Commission is placing a special emphasis on
first time voters and youth and hopes that participants in these programs
would also apply to serve as PEC members in the fall. The CEC plans to
reissue recommendations to the DECs to consider experience and training
when selecting new PEC members.


*Inter-Agency Commission for Free and Fair Elections (IACFF)*


A week prior to the delegation’s visit, the IACFF, a temporary body
established by July 1 of each electoral year to respond to allegations of
electoral violations by state officials, held its first meeting. The IACFF
works under the Ministry of Justice, coordinates multi-stakeholder dialogue
on electoral issues, and is authorized to recommend action to government
offices, law enforcement authorities, public servants, and political
parties. While interlocutors from parties and CSOs acknowledged the IACFF’s
role as a forum to air grievances, they expressed dissatisfaction with the
current working environment of the commission and little trust in the
body’s political will to deter violations and ensure that its
recommendations are upheld. Regrettably, CSOs are considering leaving the
format altogether.


*RECOMMENDATIONS*


Recently parliament enacted reforms addressing some concerns from previous
elections, including provisions enhancing secrecy of voter data, extension
of observers’ rights to follow the work of the election commission outside
of the official election period, registration of deregistered voters, and
bring the electoral laws in line with new constitutional amendments. These
amendments address some of the previously made recommendations and should
positively impact the electoral process.


However, a number of long-standing recommendations from both citizen
observer groups and the international community, including those of NDI,
should be considered seriously. This delegation offers here only
recommendations that can be addressed ahead of the upcoming election.
Longer-term recommendations, such as those requiring legislative action,
will be made in subsequent NDI observer reports.


● The president should set an election date as soon as possible to
ensure relevant regulations around campaigning can be applied and parties
and candidates can commence their official campaigns.

● Parties, government, election officials, CSOs, and media should
use this opportunity to engage with the public to bolster the democratic
process and encourage civic participation.

● Government leaders should undertake a visible, concerted effort to
ensure that there is a clear separation between the party and the state and
that public officials or administrative resources are not employed for
campaign purposes. Government leadership should clearly communicate to all
civil servants and the public that abuse of administrative resources will
not be tolerated, and that violators will face prosecution.

● The CEC should exercise its legal authority to investigate the
substance of serious claims related to potential electoral violations, even
when complaint procedures did not meet formal requirements.

● During the upcoming recruitment process for professional PEC
officials, the election administration should better clarify the
qualifications and selection procedures, ensure that vacancies are broadly
advertised well in advance, and guarantee that all hiring decisions are
taken transparently, during the commission sessions in which all parties
are present.

● The CEC should ensure that all PEC members are properly trained and
understand counting procedures and that results protocols are not amended
without checking the material evidence, including by conducting recounts
when necessary.

● The IACFF should address concerns raised by CSOs and political
parties and ensure a constructive working environment to effectively
address issues brought to its attention in a timely, professional, and
impartial manner.

● To avoid the perception of impunity, prosecutors and judges should
ensure impartial, swift application of justice to the cases of violence
during the 2016 and 2017 elections to help deter such incidents in the
future and send a positive message to the public.

● Finally, as elections approach, it is possible that Georgia will
be subject to an increased disinformation and attacks on its democracy.
Georgian CSOs and government authorities should continue efforts to counter
these threats.


While this delegation believes recommended legislative and technical fixes
can address some of the problems raised in the election process, the most
serious obstacles to the 2018 election cannot be addressed through laws and
procedures. As stated, the issues of resources, particularly alleged abuses
of state resources, and intimidation of voters and candidates, require
political will. These problems have plagued elections across different
governments and will, without action, continue to be passed onto future
elections. Therefore proactive leadership at all levels of government is
required.


Mechanisms for oversight, enforcement, and sanctioning need to be
implemented. Clear directives to all state employees outlining expectations
of conduct and consequences for violations of appropriate political
participation are needed. This should be monitored through specific
oversight of state bodies, particularly state security services. Breaking
this cycle of abuse will have a measurable effect on building public trust
in elections and bolstering Georgia’s democracy, and present an important
opportunity for this government.


*THE DELEGATION AND ITS WORK*


The six-member NDI delegation held meetings from July 23 to 26 with
prospective candidates and political parties from across the political
spectrum; members of the CEC; the SAO; and the IACFF; the president; the
prime minister; CSOs, including citizen election observer groups; media
representatives; and representatives of the international and diplomatic
communities. The delegation is deeply grateful to all those with whom it
met and who shared their views generously. The delegation also expresses
its appreciation to the United States Agency for International Development
for supporting this mission.


NDI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization working to support and
strengthen democratic institutions worldwide through citizen participation,
openness and accountability in government. NDI has observed more than 200
elections in every region in the world, including elections in Georgia
since 1992.


*NDI CONTACT INFORMATION*

Laura Thornton, lthornton@ndi.org (+995 599 566 852)

Diana Chachua, dchachua@ndi.org (+995 577 779 639)


------------------------------

[1] <#m_7698277296354444700__ftnref1> See Media Development Foundation
(MDF) report ‘Pre-Election Financial Media Environment 2017’; Transparency
International (TI) Georgia report ‘Media Advertising Market - Changes and
Challenges in 2016’; TI-Georgia statement on the Rustavi 2 Case; TI-Georgia
report ‘Georgian Media Environment from 2012 Parliamentary Elections till
Present’.

[2] <#m_7698277296354444700__ftnref2> April 2017 NDI poll: 84 percent
support direct elections; http://caucasusbarometer.org/
en/na2017ge/PRESELECT/

[3] <#m_7698277296354444700__ftnref3> See the SAO’s final report on 2017
Municipal Elections.
<https://monitoring.sao.ge/files/2017-clis-archevnebi/%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%A9%E1%83%94%E1%83%95%E1%83%9C%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1%20III%20%E1%83%90%E1%83%9C%E1%83%92%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98%E1%83%A8%E1%83%98.pdf>

[4] <#m_7698277296354444700__ftnref4> Joint International Society for Fair
Elections and Democracy (ISFED), TI-Georgia and the Georgian Young Lawyers’
Association (GYLA) Evaluation of the Pre-Election Environment: 15 out of 31
companies that donated to the ruling party were awarded state contracts in
2017 through a simplified procurement, totaling GEL 2,145,022, while they
donated GEL 1,021,793 in favor of the party. According to TI-Georgia, some
of the natural persons that donated in favor of the ruling party were
affiliated with 70 legal entities that were awarded at least a single state
contract through a simplified public procurement in 2017.

[5] <#m_7698277296354444700__ftnref5> Recommendations for Improving the
Electoral Environment available at http://www.isfed.ge/main/1389/eng/

[6] <#m_7698277296354444700__ftnref6> The CEC, DECs and PECs were reduced
from 13 to 12 members, with six professional and six party-nominated
positions. Instead of the previous system of allocating one partisan seat
to each qualifying party, the amended code allocates partisan seats to
parties based on the proportion of total votes received by each party in
the previous parliamentary elections. Only parties that cross the five
percent threshold and form a faction in parliament are eligible for
election commission seats.

[7] <#m_7698277296354444700__ftnref7> Of more than 30 requests for recounts
in 2017 municipal elections, only two were granted